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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF TEACHING
AND PERFORMING SACRED CHORAL
MUSIC IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS
FAITH D. KASPARIAN
The imposition of religion on children in public schools is a
violation of the doctrine of separation of church and state. To
compel children in a public school to sing Christian devotional
music is tantamount to imposing religious practice on children.1
Singing religious songs as a class assignment . . . is not a reli-
gious exercise to be equated with classroom prayers or Bible
readings. . . . ‘Public schools are not required to delete from the
curriculum all material that may offend religious sensibility.’ If
someone will sound an A, let us sing “Amen!” to that.2
INTRODUCTION
The First Amendment to the Constitution states “Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion.”3 The
ultimate purpose of the Establishment Clause, and of the First
Amendment generally, is to protect the freedom of individual
conscience, “to guard and respect that sphere of inviolable con-
science and belief which is the mark of a free people.”4 Because
1. Amy R. Scheinerman, Religious Music at School, WASH. POST, Nov. 21, 1995, at
A16 (letter to editor).
2. James Kilpatrick, Let Choir Sing “Amen!” to Three Rays of Common Sense,
STATE J.-REG. (Springfield, Ill.), Oct. 24, 1995, at M1 (quoting J. Thomas Greene, Dis-
trict Judge, Utah).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
4. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592, 605 (1992); see also Wallace v. Jaffree, 472
U.S. 38, 49 (1985) (“. . . the First Amendment was adopted to curtail the power of Con-
gress to interfere with the individual’s freedom to believe, to worship, and to express
himself in accordance with the dictates of his own conscience.”); School Dist. v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203, 226 (1963) (arguing that “it is not within the power of government to in-
vade that . . . inviolable citadel of the individual heart and mind”); Everson v. Board of
Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8–14 (1947) (chronicling background and environment of period in
which constitutional language was adopted and citing James Madison’s argument in oppo-
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public schools are uniquely positioned to shape the development
of the individual conscience, Establishment Clause controversy
involving public schools has been especially contentious.5 The
arena of debate about what can take place in public schools has
been called the “central battleground” for Establishment Clause
conflict because the debate over “what teachers can teach, what
books may be used, what songs sung . . . strikes at the heart of
many families’ sense of spiritual freedom.”6
As the opening quotations illustrate, there is considerable
debate as to whether the use of sacred choral music7 in public
schools violates the Establishment Clause. This debate revives the
historic conflict surrounding the relationship between music and
religion. The conflict is not new; the locale of the conflict has
simply changed from worship services to public schools. Through-
out history, religious leaders have questioned the appropriateness
of using sacred music in worship services. More recently, school
administrators have questioned the appropriateness of teaching and
performing sacred music in public schools.
Music is a powerful medium that has the capacity not only to
create and to express emotions, but also to evoke powerful re-
sponses from its audience.8 It is an art that “reaches the emotions
sition to Virginia’s tax levy for the establishment of a state church: “the best interest of
a society required that the minds of men always be wholly free”); Laura Underkuffler-
Freund, The Separation of the Religious and the Secular: A Foundational Challenge to
First Amendment Theory, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 837, 958–59 (1995) (“The protection
of freedom of conscience lay at the base of two great and emerging principles: free exer-
cise of religion and the destruction of religious establishment by government. . . .
[R]eligious establishments by government were seen as potentially corrupting . . . to
individuals, who would be forced to act in ways contrary to the dictates of conscience in
order to obtain public power or benefits. . . . ” ); id. at 961 (“[T]he protection of con-
science was imperative.”); id. at 891 (“Of all the ‘fundamental rights’ heralded during the
Founding Era, calls for freedom of conscience were the most insistent and the most
intense.”).
5. See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 583–84 (1987) (recognizing Court’s
vigilance in monitoring compliance with Establishment Clause particularly in elementary
and secondary schools given impressionability of students and that attendance is involun-
tary).
6. Nancy Gibbs, America’s Holy War, TIME, Dec. 9, 1991, at 61, 65.
7. “Sacred” is a musical term of art that refers to music with religious content, as
opposed to “secular” music, which has no religious content.
8. See ARNOLD PERRIS, MUSIC AS PROPAGANDA 138 (1985). Even the Supreme
Court has commented on the power of music:
Music is one of the oldest forms of human expression. From Plato’s discourse
in the Republic to the totalitarian state in our own times, rulers have known its
capacity to appeal to the intellect and to the emotions, and have censored
musical compositions to serve the needs of the state. . . . The Constitution
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easily, often (always?) ahead of intellectual awareness.”9 Accord-
ingly, incorporating music into a ceremony, such as a worship
service or the inauguration of a political leader, can make that
ceremony more evocative, more meaningful.10 For centuries, how-
ever, religious leaders have had conflicting views concerning the
use of sacred music within the worship service.11 This conflict
stems from the inherently dual nature of vocal music. Vocal music
can at once be a vehicle for the promotion of a textual message
and an independent aesthetic entity that in no way depends on the
performer’s or the listener’s endorsement of the textual mes-
sage.12 Over fifteen centuries ago, St. Augustine recognized that
prohibits any like attempts in our own legal order. Music, as a form of expres-
sion and communication, is protected under the First Amendment.
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 790 (1989).
9. PERRIS, supra note 8, at 6.
10.
Music began by serving communal purposes . . . . It has continued to be used
as an accompaniment to collective activities; as an adjunct to social ceremonies
and public occasions. . . . In our society, one cannot imagine a Coronation or a
State funeral taking place in the absence of music. . . . Music has the effect of
intensifying or underlining the emotion which a particular event calls forth, by
simultaneously co-ordinating the emotions of a group of people.
ANTHONY STORR, MUSIC AND THE MIND 23–24 (1992).
11. See PERRIS, supra note 8, at 155 (referring to conflict between religious leaders
and sacred music composers: “[N]o other genre of Western [m]usic documents such a
long and strenuous contest between artist and ‘ruler’ for the attention of their audi-
ence.”).
12. See MUSICAGE: CAGE MUSES ON WORDS ART MUSIC 69 (Joan Retallack ed.,
1996) [hereinafter MUSICAGE] (“[S]ound sometimes becomes so powerful that one can
put meaning aside. And vice versa.”); STORR, supra note 10, at 75 (“Stravinsky strongly
objected to the notion that a piece of music is a transcendental idea expressed in terms
of music . . . . He said that ‘A new piece of music is a new reality’ . . . ‘music express-
es itself’. . . ‘[the composer] can say nothing whatever about meanings.’”); JEAN-JACQUES
NATTIEZ, MUSIC AND DISCOURSE 126 (Carolyn Abbate trans., 1990) (“For users of mu-
sic, composers, performers, and listeners, all participants in a ‘total musical fact,’ musical
material will establish connections to their lived experience and to the exterior
world. . . . But musical material’s play of forms is itself a semiological system, inasmuch
as it functions and develops independently of the extrinsic meanings conveyed . . . .”).
In discussing the dual nature of sacred music specifically, it has been noted that
music originally written for worship service can become admired for its aesthetic identity
and devalued for its religious significance. See PERRIS, supra note 8, at 148. The requiem
Masses of Mozart, Berlioz, and Fauré were originally written for “immediate liturgical
use” but are today “thought of as secular concert works and are so heard by the pub-
lic.” Id. at 149; see also STORR, supra note 10, at 22:
To play the hymn ‘Abide With Me’ at football matches is in dubious taste; but
those who join in singing it feel an enhanced sense of joint participation, even
if they do not believe the words which they are singing, or subscribe to the
Christian beliefs which the hymn expresses. . . . Music’s power to fan the flame
of piety may be more apparent than real; more concerned with enhancing
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sacred music could be both secular and religious, and agonized
over that duality:
[S]ometimes I feel that I treat [sacred music] with more honor
than it deserves. I realize that when they are sung, these sacred
words stir my mind to greater religious fervor and kindle in me a
more ardent flame of piety than they would if they were not
sung . . . . But I ought not to allow my mind to be paralyzed by
the gratification of my senses, which often leads it astray. . . . I
waver between the danger that lies in gratifying the senses and
the benefits which, as I know from experience, can accrue from
singing. . . . I am inclined to approve of the custom of singing in
church, in order that by indulging the ears weaker spirits may be
inspired with feelings of devotion. Yet when I find the singing it-
self more moving than the truth which it conveys, I confess that
this is a grievous sin . . . .13
Therefore, while religious leaders have recognized the unique
power of sacred music to instill religious passion, they have simul-
taneously feared that the secular and sensual pleasure of the music
will take precedence over the sacred text it conveys.14 Simply put,
“[t]he arts are a powerful but dangerous ally to religion: They can
carry the message, but they can also run away with it.”15
group feeling within the congregation than with promoting the individual’s rela-
tion with God.
13. St. Augustine, The Testimony of St. Augustine, in PIERO WEISS & RICHARD
TARUSKIN, MUSIC IN THE WESTERN WORLD 29, 32 (1984) (emphasis added). A modern
version of the debate between music and religion arose within the Emmanuel Church of
Boston, famous for its tradition of performing, as Bach had intended, a complete Bach
cantata as a part of the regular Sunday worship service. See Richard Dyer, Emmanuel
Revives an Ancient Battle: Music vs. Religion, BOSTON GLOBE, July 23, 1993, at 39.
Emmanuel was recognized in the 1970s for being the only church other than Bach’s own
church in Leipzig to have performed a complete cycle of Bach’s sacred cantatas. See id.
In 1993, Emmanuel’s music program “found itself on the firing line” of the “immemorial
uneasy relationship between the arts and religion” when critics accused the music pro-
gram of “worshipping Bach rather than God.” Id.
14. See PERRIS, supra note 8, at 124:
Music in all worship is expected to heighten the desired emotional effect in the
listener, to emphasize the ritual text, especially certain significant words, and to
focus the worshipper’s attention on the rite. But the danger of so sensuous a
phenomenon as music is that it may be more seductive than the rite itself, and
that the musicians may evoke more interest than the priests. If the music in the
worship service is “entertaining,” is the religious ambience destroyed? . . . In
any one culture are there two kinds of musical expression, one identified as
sacred, and the other as nonsacred and appropriate only for secular occasions?
15. Dyer, supra note 13, at 39.
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The tension between music and religion raises important ques-
tions. Is a song with a sacred text only a vehicle for religious wor-
ship and divine praise, or an independent secular aesthetic entity
as well? Once a sacred text is set to music in the form of a song,
can either element of the song—text or music—be isolated or
viewed as more powerful than the other? Can one sing a sacred
song, recognizing the important aesthetic relationship between
music and text, without engaging in a religious exercise? These
questions remain when the locale of the tension shifts from wor-
ship service to public schools. In the public school context, howev-
er, the fear is not that the secular pleasure of the music will take
precedence over the sacred text, but rather that the sacred text
will take precedence over the music, with unconstitutional Estab-
lishment Clause ramifications.16
Discerning the Establishment Clause ramifications of using
sacred choral music in public schools is difficult because the Su-
preme Court has never addressed the issue17 and because, as
courts and commentators have noted, the body of Establishment
Clause precedent is confusing at best.18 Nevertheless, the Court’s
16. Although there are also ramifications to the use of sacred choral music in public
schools under the Free Exercise Clause, this Note will not address the Free Exercise
Clause and will focus solely on the Establishment Clause.
17. See, e.g., Bauchman v. West High Sch., 900 F. Supp. 248, 253 (D. Utah 1995)
(“Neither the Supreme Court nor the Tenth Circuit have had occasion to determine
whether choral singing at a graduation exercise constitutes a prayer which would impli-
cate the First Amendment Establishment Clause.”).
While some lower courts have confronted the Establishment Clause ramifications of
teaching sacred choral music in public schools, see infra Section II.B, their analysis of
issues has often been perfunctory and has not been helpful in providing guidance to local
decisionmakers. See infra notes 252–60 and accompanying text (discussing Doe v.
Duncanville Indep. Sch. Dist., 70 F.3d 402, 404–07 (5th Cir. 1995) (accepting choir
director’s unrelated justification for maintaining sacred piece as choir’s “theme song” and
not addressing certain facts—choir’s singing of song at end of class on Fridays and on
bus rides after competition—that may alter the blanket statement that “[a]ll parties recog-
nize that the Establishment Clause does not prohibit DISD choirs from singing religious
songs as part of a secular music program, in accord with School District of Abington
Township v. Schempp.”) (citations omitted)); see also Robert M. O’Neil, Who Says You
Can’t Pray?, 3 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 347, 362 (1996) (arguing that “the issue of reli-
gious music and school choirs . . . deserves closer scrutiny than the Duncanville Court
provided . . . .”).
18. This confusion stems from seemingly inconsistent decisions, see infra note 192 and
accompanying text, and from varying analytical approaches, see infra Section II.A. See
also Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 639 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (chastising the
Court’s “embarrassing Establishment Clause jurisprudence”); Doe v. Duncanville Indep.
Sch. Dist., 70 F.3d 402, 405 (5th Cir. 1995) (“[M]odern Establishment Clause jurispru-
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Establishment Clause precedent may still be instructive insofar as
it illustrates a distinction between constitutionally permissible and
impermissible public school activities. The Court has consistently
held state-directed19 “religious exercises” in the public schools,
such as state-directed prayer20 and state-directed devotional Bible
reading,21 to be unconstitutional. On the other hand, the Court
has implied that state-directed study of religion or the Bible, as
part of a secular program of education, would be constitutional.22
Specifically, in School District of Abington Township v.
Schempp,23 the Court indicated that teaching the Bible as litera-
ture would be constitutional.24 Presumably, if teaching the Bible
as literature would be constitutional, so too would teaching sacred
choral music, ostensibly “the Bible as song.” Unfortunately, the
Court’s dictum in Schempp is broadly phrased and does not pro-
vide specific guidance.25 Therefore, the difficulty lies in distin-
guishing a “religious exercise” from a secular study of religion.
dence is rife with confusion"); Doe v. Duncanville Indep. Sch. Dist., 994 F.2d 160, 166
n.7 (5th Cir. 1993) (noting the “Supreme Court’s confusing and confused Establishment
Clause jurisprudence”); O’Neil, supra note 17, at 349 (“The boundaries of permissible
activity under the Establishment Clause remain elusive in many important areas.”);
Underkuffler-Freund, supra note 4, at 838 (describing Court’s Free Exercise and Estab-
lishment Clause precedent as “jurisprudence of complex, conflicting, and often undulating
principles”); id. at 848 (reiterating that Free Exercise and Establishment Clause precedent
is a “body of jurisprudence of perhaps unparalleled contradiction and confusion”);
Kilpatrick, supra note 2, at M1 (“In the whole broad field of constitutional law, no area
is murkier than the area surrounding the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause”);
Opinion, Sound West High Ruling, SALT LAKE TRIB., June 6, 1996, at A12 (referring to
“constitutional thicket”).
19. By the term “state-directed,” this Note refers to an activity that is led or direct-
ed through state action. A stated-directed activity could involve a public school teacher,
administrator, or policy.
20. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 424 (1962).
21. See School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 205 (1963).
22. See id. at 225 (“Nothing we have said here indicates that such study . . . may
not be effected consistently with the First Amendment.”).
23. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
24. The Schempp Court explained:
It certainly may be said that the Bible is worthy of study for its literary and
historic qualities. Nothing we have said here indicates that such study of the
Bible or of religion, when presented objectively as part of a secular program of
education, may not be effected consistently with the First Amendment.
Id. at 225. The Schempp Court distinguished studying the Bible as literature or history
from the state-directed, devotional Bible reading found unconstitutional in the case, hold-
ing that the latter devotional use as a “religious exercise.” Id. (“[T]he exercises here do
not fall into those categories. They are religious exercises . . . .”).
25. See id.
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Lack of clear legal standards has resulted in widespread public
confusion over what constitutes a constitutional use of material
with religious content in the public schools. Such confusion threat-
ens the use of sacred choral music in the public schools because it
has the potential to create, and in some cases has already created,
a chilling effect on the use of all “religious” materials for teaching
purposes. This chilling effect is dangerous because music education,
particularly performance-based education, is a necessary compo-
nent of the public school curriculum, and sacred choral music is an
integral part of a complete and historically accurate music edu-
cation.26 Removal of sacred music from the performance reper-
toire would deprive students of a complete educational experience
by presenting an erroneous view of the Western music tradition.
This Note confronts the Establishment Clause issues involved
in using sacred choral music in the public schools—and hence con-
fronts the questions inherent in the dual nature of vocal music—by
analyzing three hypothetical fact patterns.27 In analyzing similar
Establishment Clause fact patterns, the Supreme Court has focused
on two factors—the purpose and the effect of the use. However,
analysis of the hypotheticals in this Note reveals that the most
instructive factor in resolving these Establishment Clause questions
is not the purpose—not the subjective motivation of the individual
who selects the sacred repertoire—but rather, the effect of using
the music. Further, in determining that effect, the Court has fo-
cused on the context of the use. In analyzing the teaching and
performing of sacred choral music, the following factors will likely
contribute to a court’s analysis of context: the teaching style of the
choir director, including statements made during rehearsal; the site
and time of year of a concert; the placement of particular selec-
tions within the order of the program; the presence of program
notes28 explaining the musical significance of works performed;
and the nature of performative artifice—the extent to which the
performance underscores the nature of the music as independent
aesthetic entity.29
26. See infra Part I.
27. These hypotheticals are partially modeled on aspects of lower court cases ad-
dressing the constitutionality of teaching and performing sacred choral music in public
schools. See infra Part III.
28. “Program notes” is a musical term of art that refers to a prose description in the
concert program of the musical significance and relevant musical features of a particular
work.
29. Context is crucial, not only from a legal perspective, but also from a musical
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With this analytical framework in mind, this Note argues that,
in true teaching or performance contexts, the use of sacred choral
music in public schools is not only educationally necessary but
constitutionally permissible. Part I of this Note illustrates the wide-
spread public confusion over what is permissible activity in the
public schools, depicts the chilling effect that results from such
confusion, and explains the danger of such a chilling effect by
articulating pedagogical justifications for teaching and performing
sacred choral music in public schools. Part II of this Note discusses
relevant Establishment Clause precedent and proposes an analyti-
cal framework for evaluating the Establishment Clause ramifica-
tions of teaching and performing sacred choral music in the public
schools. Using this framework, as well as Supreme Court and
lower court precedent, Part III considers, through three hypotheti-
cal fact patterns, the constitutionality of using sacred choral music
in varying public school contexts.
I. THE POTENTIAL ELIMINATION OF SACRED CHORAL MUSIC
FROM PUBLIC SCHOOLS
Since the Supreme Court has made no definitive legal state-
ment, sacred choral music may be unnecessarily eliminated from
public school curricula as a result of general public confusion over
what uses of materials with religious content are permissible in the
nation’s public schools.30 Throughout the country, surprising anec-
perspective. A musical work is not created merely by the composer’s writing of the music
and setting of that music to text; rather, the performer’s interpretation and the listener’s
perception contribute to the creation and meaning of the musical work. Accordingly, the
context of a particular performance, including the performer’s interpretation of the music,
is as much an aspect of the aesthetic entity as the music written in the score. See
NATTIEZ, supra note 12, at ix-x, 72 (endorsing “holistic vision” of music, called musical
semiology, stating that a musical work is also “constituted by the procedures that have
engendered it (acts of composition), and the procedures to which it gives rise: acts of
interpretation and perception” and positing that a musical work is not “wholly ‘produced’
unless it has been played” and that the compositional process extends until the perfor-
mance is complete). Composer and aesthetic philosopher John Cage embraces this con-
cept of meaning-as-use and argues that the listener then contributes by enacting the
meaning through its use. See MUSICAGE, supra note 12, at 67. Cage explains, “I’m fre-
quently now in the situation of having to listen to music which I’ve already written,
which is finished as far as I’m concerned. But when I haven’t made it clear in many
ways what it is, it becomes of course the way that it is made by other people. . . . I
don’t know anything to expect in relation to it . . . .” Id. at 200. Arguably, a composer
can never make clear what an aesthetic entity is, especially an aesthetic such as vocal
music which has—at least—a dual identity.
30. For example, in a December 1994 CBS News/New York Times poll, the majority
FILE:C:\WP51\DLJ\KASPARIA.PP Dec 12/06/97 Sat 10:47am
1997] TEACHING SACRED CHORAL MUSIC 1119
dotes are plentiful. A Maryland school teacher told a kindergarten
student that she could not sing a verse of a religious song to her
classmates, even though the teacher had asked each child to share
a favorite song with the class.31 And an Illinois school teacher,
upon finding the word “God” in a phonics textbook, instructed her
class of seven-year-olds to cross it out, explaining that it is illegal
to mention God in a public school.32
Recognition of the problem posed by this confusion has come
from many sources. A survey of the Music Educators Journal, a
publication of the Music Educators National Conference (MENC),
reveals numerous articles from the 1960s to the present that recog-
nize the confusion over what is permissible and support the use of
sacred music in public schools.33 Government officials, including
United States Secretary of Education Richard W. Riley,34 Acting
Solicitor General Walter Dellinger,35 and August Steinhilber,36
of all Americans—55%—did not know that a child’s right to pray privately in school is
constitutionally protected. See Statement by U.S. Secretary of Education Richard W. Riley
regarding “Religion in Public Schools: A Joint Statement of Current Law,” April 13,
1995; see also AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, RELIGION IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS:
A JOINT STATEMENT OF CURRENT LAW 1 (1995) (“Some say . . . that the law is so
murky that school officials cannot know what is legally permissible.”).
31. See Press Briefing, Statement by Secretary of Education Richard W. Riley, July
12, 1995 [hereinafter Riley Press Briefing].
32. See Gibbs, supra note 6, at 61.
33. See MENC, Religious Music in the Schools, MUSIC EDUCATORS J., July 1996, at
insert (“The First Amendment does not forbid all mention of religion in the public
schools . . . .”); MENC, Religious Music in the Schools, MUSIC EDUCATORS J., Nov.
1984, at 28; Rebecca Grier, Sacred Music in the Schools: An Update, MUSIC EDUCATORS
J., Nov. 1979, at 48; John Aquino, Can We Still Sing Christmas Carols in Public
Schools?, MUSIC EDUCATORS J., Nov. 1976, at 71; Donald Meints, Are We Violating the
Constitution?, MUSIC EDUCATORS J., Jan. 1965, at 62 (“In the light of recent decisions
by the United States Supreme Court, some choral music directors in high schools
throughout the country are confused about the place of sacred choral music in the public
school music program.”); Charles M. Fisher, The Place of Religious Music in the School
Curriculum, MUSIC EDUCATORS J., Nov. 1966, at 66 (noting that even much secular
music is “religious” in the broad sense of the word and that such music should not be
excluded from public school curriculums); Benjamin J. Novak, Building Ties Between
School and Church Music, MUSIC EDUCATORS J., Sept.-Oct. 1963, at 119 (“It is difficult
to argue validly against the inclusion of some church music as part of a balanced musical
repertoire for all schools.”).
34. See Riley Press Briefing, supra note 31 (“[T]here’s an awful lot of confusion out
there. And I see it and hear it.”).
35. See Laurie Goodstein, School Prayer Directive May Not Settle All Cases; Many
Religious Disputes Fall in Gray Zone, WASH. POST, July 15, 1995, at A1 (quoting Acting
Solicitor General Dellinger’s statement that “the president believes it is important that we
reduce the amount of confusion and misinformation that currently surrounds the sub-
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general counsel for the National School Boards Association, have
also acknowledged confusion over the relationship between religion
and public schools. And at least one legal commentator, recogniz-
ing the confusion, has opposed the use of sacred choral music in
public schools, proposing guidelines for religious holiday obser-
vances in public schools that would eliminate sacred music from
such programs.37
Recently, the President and numerous legal organizations have
attempted to dispel the myths and to alleviate the confusion by
issuing statements concerning religion and the public schools.38
Perhaps the most wide-reaching was a four-page directive issued,
at the instruction of the President, by the United States Depart-
ment of Education.39 In August of 1995, Secretary Riley sent this
directive to the superintendents of every school district in the
United States.40 The directive summarizes the Schempp Court’s
implication that state-directed study of religion, as part of a secu-
lar program of education, is constitutional and supports, in general
terms, the use of sacred choral music in public school curricula:
Public schools may not provide religious instruction, but they
may teach about religion, including the Bible or other scripture:
the history of religion, comparative religion, the Bible (or other
ject”).
36. In 1995, the Washington Post quoted Steinhilber’s complaint that: “There was a
time when most of the questions I got were on [AIDS] issues. . . . Then it moved to
drugs and drug testing, then sexual harassment. Now, number one is religion.” Id.
37. This commentator has argued, “Most hymns and many carols are prayers or
other expressions of worship set to music.” Note, Religious-Holiday Observances in the
Public Schools, 48 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1116, 1144 n.174 (1973). The proposed guidelines
state:
The content of any such programs must relate only to the secular aspect of the
holiday. . . . seasonal songs such as “Easter Parade,” “Over the River and
Through the Woods,” “Deck the Halls,” “White Christmas,” etc., may be per-
formed. . . . Hymns, songs, carols . . . expressing reverence to God, Jesus, Bud-
dha, Mohammed or any other religious prophet or leader, may not be prepared
or performed as part of a holiday observance. . . . The atmosphere and trap-
pings must be free from any element of devotional setting. Processionals, cleri-
cal robes, candles or other church-like or reverential lighting effects, scenery or
costumes may not be used.
Id. at 1144 (footnotes omitted).
38. See, e.g., Remarks by the President on Religious Liberty in America, July 12,
1995, at James Madison High School, Vienna, Va. [hereinafter Clinton Religious Liberty
Remarks]; THE FREEDOM FORUM FIRST AMENDMENT CENTER, A PARENT’S GUIDE TO
RELIGION IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS (1995) [hereinafter PARENT’S GUIDE TO RELIGION];
ACLU, supra note 30.
39. See Department of Education Directive, Aug. 10, 1995.
40. See Cover letter included with Department of Education Directive, Aug. 10, 1995.
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scripture)-as-literature, and the role of religion in the history of
the United States and other countries all are permissible public
school subjects. Similarly, it is permissible to consider religious
influences on art, music, literature, and social studies.41
The statements of other organizations similarly support teaching
and performing sacred music in public school curricula as part of
an objective program of secular education.42 Although some offi-
cials feel that the Department of Education directive has solved
the confusion,43 controversies and litigation have unfortunately
continued.44 As Dellinger explains, despite Presidential efforts,
41. Department of Education Directive, Aug. 10, 1995.
42. See, e.g., Clinton Religious Liberty Remarks, supra note 38, at 7–8:
The First Amendment does not—I will say again—does not convert our schools
into religion-free zones. . . . Some school officials and teachers and parents be-
lieve that the Constitution forbids any religious expression at all in public
schools. That is wrong. Our courts have made it clear that that is wrong. . . .
Teachers can and certainly should teach about religion and the contributions it
has made to our history, our values, our knowledge, to our music and our art
in our country and around the world . . . .
See also PARENT’S GUIDE TO RELIGION, supra note 38, at 7:
Sacred music may be sung or played as part of a school’s academic program.
School concerts that present a variety of selections may include religious music.
The use of music, art, drama, or literature with religious themes is permissible
if it serves a sound educational goal in the curriculum, but not if used as a
vehicle for promoting religious belief.
See also RUTHERFORD INST., RECOGNITION OF RELIGIOUS HOLIDAYS IN PUBLIC
SCHOOLS 2 (1993).
43. See Tamara Henry, Religion’s Place in Public Schools: Holidays Bring Issue to the
Fore, USA TODAY, Dec. 7, 1995, at 5D (“August Steinhilber vigorously disagrees that
wide confusion still exists. As general counsel for the National School Boards Associa-
tion, he says traditionally his office is flooded with calls beginning with Halloween
through Christmas. ‘So far, I don’t think I’ve gotten two calls,’ he says.”). This same
article notes a recent anecdote involving an art teacher in Alto, Tex. The teacher fumed
when a seventh-grade student drew a picture of Santa and Jesus, and upon tearing up
the sketches told the student, “You have a problem!” Id.
44. A post-directive letter to the editor of the St. Petersburg Times demonstrates the
continued controversy:
I strongly object to the March 26 letter that so unfairly criticized the northwest
Elementary music director for including two ‘religious songs’ during a district
concert recently. For the objector’s information, the Religious Freedom Restora-
tion Act was signed into law over two years ago by President Clinton, and the
objectionable songs would certainly come within the ‘incidental effect’ of the
RFRA. To charge the music director with a ‘flagrant attempt to religiously
indoctrinate’ and ‘abuse his position to flout the establishment clause of the
First Amendment’ is both obnoxious and idiotic.
Urban Meyer, Letter to Editor, Critic of School Concert Was Uninformed, Rude Series,
ST. PETERSBURG TIMES (Fla.), Apr. 1, 1996, at A1. See also supra notes 1-2 and accom-
panying text (demonstrating post-directive debate); Priscilla H. Crago, Religious Songs Are
Prayers Set to Music, TIMES UNION (Albany, N.Y.), Nov. 16, 1995, at A14 (quoting Al-
bany, N.Y., parent who asserts: “[R]eligious songs are merely organized prayers set to
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“[t]here will always, in an area like this, be cases in the margin
where controversy will continue.”45 Continued controversy stems
from the highly sensitive and personal nature of the issue, from
the Court’s silence on the constitutionality of using sacred choral
music in public schools, and from general confusion in Establish-
ment Clause precedent.
With the lack of a direct statement from the Supreme Court,
continuing confusion and controversy have the potential to create,
and in some cases have already created, a chilling effect on the
use of sacred choral music in public schools. Music educators re-
ceive pressure from parents and administrators to eliminate sacred
music from the curriculum. One retired elementary music adminis-
trator has aptly described the situation:
Music teachers have enough pressures today without the repeated
beating over what religious music is or isn’t safe to program for
specific school holiday observations, for regular curriculum use,
or for artistic and historical use. . . . Each holiday brings its own
perky patrons peeking around the back side of the practice piano
to see if we are about to program too much/little to satisfy indi-
vidual and varied expectations of how they want each holiday
honored/ignored. Add to this group the word warriors who
pounce on the phone to scorch our inner ear when they discover
that the song we taught yesterday had the word spirit in it . . . .
In many areas, religious music used in the schools, absent from
clearly understood court-case related policy outlining its appropri-
ate and acceptable use, is a gigantic kettle of boiling water in
search of a scaldee. . . . Now where were we? Oh yes, teaching
children music.46
music. Not only has the Supreme Court banned prayers in public schools, but the Bill of
Rights does not allow establishment of a particular religion.”); Goodstein, supra note 35,
at A6 (quoting an attorney who defends the rights of students “to present the full musi-
cal repertoire” who stated, “Whoever heard of a choir that can’t sing anything from the
Renaissance, most things from the Baroque period, or for that matter, even ‘The Battle
Hymn of the Republic’? . . . It’s beyond dispute that much of the art that should be
taught in schools originates with one great religious tradition or another. . . .”);
Bauchman v. West High Sch., Civ. No. 95-C–506G, 1996 WL 407856, at *10 (D. Utah
May 30, 1996) (denying Bauchman’s motion to amend her Establishment Cause claim that
was dismissed in Bauchman v. West High School, 900 F. Supp. 254 (D. Utah 1995)).
45. Goodstein, supra note 35, at A1.
46. Charles Reynolds, Sacred Music: How to Avoid Cooking Your Holiday Goose,
MUSIC EDUCATORS J., Nov. 1984, at 31–33.
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A former choir director, who incorporated sacred choral pieces in
her choir’s repertoire, explained that at times she received pressure
from school administrators to eliminate sacred music from the
curriculum even though she never discussed religion or theology.47
Not surprisingly, confusion, controversy, and public pressure
have led educators and school boards to self-censorship. A school
district music coordinator in Palo Alto has explained: “We have to
be very, very careful . . . . We can play seasonal music, like
‘Sleigh Ride,’ but only songs that in no way mention God or Je-
sus.”48 At least one school board has enacted guidelines that
highly restrict the use of sacred choral music. In response to com-
plaints by parents about a December music program, the Los
Altos, California school district drafted a policy restricting the
public performance of vocal music in holiday programs.49 A draft
of the policy stated: “Under no circumstances may educators as-
sign or recruit students to sing songs or parts of songs that are not
neutral among all religious beliefs (including polytheistic, monothe-
istic, non-theistic or atheistic religious beliefs).”50 Less restrictive
but vaguely worded guidelines may similarly result in the elimi-
nation of sacred music from public school music curricula because
of the difficulty in determining boundaries.51
This chilling effect is dangerous. The importance of music
education, particularly performance-based education, in public
schools rests on varied and expansive justifications. Aristotle ar-
gued: “Clearly actual participation in performing is going to make
a big difference to the quality of the person that will be pro-
duced . . . . musical education must include actual performing.”52
Echoing this statement, modern theorists have argued that: “Of
singular importance is the development of the attitude that partici-
47. See Telephone Interview with Shirley Laman, retired public school director of
choral activities in Belmont, Massachusetts (Oct. 11, 1996) (“I wasn’t teaching religion. I
was teaching music.”).
48. John Wildermuth, A Little Discord Over School Music: Wringing the Religion out
of Winter Concerts Isn’t As Easy As It Sounds, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 10, 1995, at P1.
49. See id.
50. Id.
51. See ALBERT J. MENENDEZ, THE DECEMBER WARS 89–90 (1993) (citing less re-
strictive policies, including a 1974 Ithaca, N.Y., policy allowing religious music as part of
“secular program” or concert provided it is presented in other than a “religious con-
text”).
52. Aristotle, Aristotle On the Purposes of Music, in WEISS & TARUSKIN, supra note
13, at 11.
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pation in actual performance produces a better grasp of the aes-
thetic import of great music than mere listening or nonparticipa-
tion.”53 Education research also reveals the important social func-
tion served by music education, demonstrating that, by providing
opportunities to work in group settings, music performance
strengthens the student’s ability to relate and work with others in
pursuit of a common goal.54 Musical knowledge has been found
to have intrinsic worth as a language, as a “distinctive way of
knowing,”55 and as an integral part of human civilization.56 From
a functional standpoint as well, study of the arts, including music,
has been shown to enhance students’ academic success in other
areas, as shown by higher standardized test performance and high-
er grades in non-arts classes.57 Performance training also instills
discipline and higher quality expectations; students learn the ne-
cessity of striving for perfection through exposure to the principle
that, while “a 90 percent correct performance on a math test is an
A . . . a 90 percent correct performance on stage is a disaster.”58
As the MENC has explained, to provide students with a com-
plete music education, it is essential that the curriculum include
53. Abraham Schwadron, On Religion, Music, and Education, J. RES. MUSIC EDUC.,
at 157, 165 (1970).
54. See Estelle R. Jorgensen, Justifying Music Instruction in American Public Schools:
A Historical Perspective, ARTS EDUC. POL’Y REV., July-Aug. 1995, at 31, 32 (“Commonly
undertaken in group settings, [music] affords opportunities for individual students to re-
late with others in the context of creating, performing, and listening to music. It also
constitutes an agent for mental and personal growth.”).
55. Id. at 33.
[Music] constitutes an expression of human experience that is irreplaceable by
any other means, it makes a unique contribution to human existence, it consti-
tutes a “language” or a “symbol system” that is distinctively musical and un-
abashedly non-scientific, and it is known holistically and immediately in ways
that primarily implicate the imagination and intuition. To take music out of the
school curriculum . . . would result in impoverishing the curriculum by deleting
a distinctive way of knowing and a vital part of human civilization and knowl-
edge.
Id. (referring to works by Philip Phenix, Nelson Goodman, and Howard Gardner).
56. See id.
57. See Scott C. Shuler, Why High School Students Should Study the Arts, MUSIC
EDUCATORS J., July 1996, at 22–23 (citing The College Board, 1987 Profile of SAT and
Achievement Test Takers, C. ENTRANCE EXAMINATION BOARD, 1, 1, 3 (1987); The Col-
lege Board, 1988 Profile of SAT and Achievement Test Takers, C. ENTRANCE EXAMINA-
TION BOARD, 1, 1, 3 (1988); The College Board, 1989 Profile of SAT and Achievement
Test Takers, C. ENTRANCE EXAMINATION BOARD, 1, 1, 3 (1989); Daniel Steinel, Grades
of High School Arts Students Compare Favorably with Other Students, 2 MENC
SOUNDPOST no. 2, Winter 1986, at 14).
58. Id. at 23.
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music of “all styles, forms, periods, and cultures.”59 It might well
be “impossible to understand the history of Western music without
[exposure to choral music, including] Gregorian chant, polyphony,
the musical settings of the Mass, and the oratorio literature.”60
Due to the fact that the Church historically patronized the arts, by
employing musicians to compose, play, and sing music for worship
services,61 sacred choral music comprises a substantial portion of
the choral music repertoire.62 Because sacred choral music consti-
tutes a substantial portion of music literature, it plays an important
role in the history of music and “should and does have an impor-
tant place in music education.”63 And, as the MENC’s most re-
cent position statement on this issue explains, the study and per-
formance of sacred choral music is not only an important, but a
necessary part of the curriculum.64
59. MENC, Position Statement, Religious Music in the Schools, in MUSIC EDUCATORS
J., Nov. 1984, at 28 [hereinafter MENC 1984 Position Statement].
60. Albert J. Menendez, Christmas in the Schools: Can Conflicts be Avoided, PHI
DELTA KAPPAN, Nov. 1994, at 239, 241.
61. For example, the career of Johann Sebastian Bach was “similar to that of many
successful musical functionaries of his time in Lutheran Germany,” in that Bach main-
tained religious employment as organist and music director in several churches, as organ-
ist and concertmaster in the chapel of the duke of Weimar, and cantor of the St.
Thomas’ school. DONALD JAY GROUT & CLAUDE V. PALISCA, A HISTORY OF WESTERN
MUSIC 497–98 (4th ed. 1988). In fact, music historians have noted the importance of the
Church in the development of Western music by stating that “the Church was ‘the chrys-
alis out of which our Western society emerged.’” Id. at 35. For example, one “‘germ of
creative power’ in the realm of music was embodied in the Gregorian Chant.” Id at
497–98.
62. See Doe v. Duncanville Indep. Sch. Dist., 70 F.3d 402, 407 (5th Cir. 1995) (ac-
cepting a music teacher’s estimation that 60–75% of serious choral music is based on
sacred themes or text and acknowledging the “dominance of religious music in this
field”); Bauchman v. West High Sch., 900 F. Supp. 254, 268 (D. Utah 1995) (noting that
choral music “often contains religious sentiment”); see also Menendez, supra note 60, at
241 (“One can argue—as many have—that the ‘best’ music, from the purely cultural
perspective, is religious in nature. Indeed, no one would deny that many anthems, carols,
and hymns, from Vivaldi’s ‘Gloria’ to Monteverdi’s ‘Christmas Vespers,’ are musically
superior to ‘Rudolph the Red-Nosed Reindeer’ or ‘Frosty the Snowman.”); MENC, Posi-
tion Statement, Religious Music in the Schools, MUSIC EDUCATORS J., Nov. 1996, insert,
at 2 [hereinafter MENC 1996 Position Statement] (“The chorales of J.S. Bach, the ‘Halle-
lujah Chorus’ from George Frideric Handel’s Messiah, spirituals, and Ernest Bloch’s Sa-
cred Service all have an important place in the development of a student’s musical under-
standing and knowledge.”).
63. MENC 1984 Position Statement, supra note 59, at 29.
64. For more than a decade, the MENC has repeatedly issued position statements
endorsing the use of sacred music in public schools. Its most recent position statement,
adopted in November of 1996, asserts: “It is the position of Music Educators National
Conference that the study and performance of religious music within an educational con-
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Although music with a sacred text may have originally been
intended to be a vehicle for religious worship and divine praise, it
also has an independent secular aesthetic identity because of its
significance as music. This is not to say that sacred music has lost
all religious significance. Certainly, sacred music may continue to
be perceived, by some listeners in some contexts, solely as a vehi-
cle for religious worship and divine praise. However, sacred music
may also be perceived—at its inception and beyond—as both a
vehicle for religious worship and a secular aesthetic entity that in
no way depends on the performer’s or the listener’s endorsement
of the textual message. It is because of this duality, because sacred
music does have an independent aesthetic identity and significance
within Western music history, that such music is an integral com-
ponent of a comprehensive music education.
Given the prevalence and importance of sacred choral music
within Western music literature, allowing sacred choral music to be
“chilled” out of the curriculum through misguided Establishment
Clause interpretation would reduce the quality of music education
in public schools. It has been argued that “[o]nly barbarians”65
would remove sacred choral music from public schools and that
such removal would disadvantage students by depriving them of
some of the best music in the genre.66 Furthermore, omitting sa-
text is a vital and appropriate part of a comprehensive music education. The omission of
sacred music from the school curriculum would result in an incomplete educational expe-
rience.” MENC 1996 Position Statement, supra note 62, at 2. Earlier position statements
were nearly identical:
It is the position of Music Educators National Conference that the study of
religious music is a vital and appropriate part of the total music experience in
both performance and listening. To omit sacred music from the repertoire or
study of music would present an incorrect and incomplete concept of the com-
prehensive nature of the art.
MENC 1984 Position Statement, supra note 59, at 29.
65. Donna M. Chavez, Christmas at School: The Goal is to Offend No One: Even the
Classroom Leaders Don’t Agree on What’s Appropriate, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 12, 1993, § 18,
at 3 (quoting Martin Marty, Professor of History of American Religion at the University
of Chicago).
66.
Musically speaking, the body of religious . . . music is vastly superior to the
secular music . . . For school choirs, public performance is as important to
learning as is what goes on in the classroom. A high school choral group . . .
denied . . . Sixteenth Century polyphonic works of Victoria and Palestrina,
Bach and Handel choruses, modern opera classics like Gian Carlo Menotti’s
Amahl and the Night Visitors, and imaginative arrangements of black spirituals
is being shortchanged musically. In many centuries the greatest music has been
the music of the church . . . .
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cred choral music from the curriculum would not only reduce the
quality of music education, but would actually present a false
music education. Ignoring the prevalence of sacred choral music
within the overall repertoire is, in a sense, to “rewrite music histo-
ry.”67 As the MENC has explained, omitting sacred music from
the curriculum “would result in an incomplete educational experi-
ence”68 and would present “an incorrect and incomplete concept
of the comprehensive nature of the art.”69
Given these pedagogical justifications for teaching and per-
forming sacred choral music in public schools, censoring sacred
choral music from curricula seems inconsistent with the principles
embodied in the First Amendment. The Supreme Court has re-
peatedly stressed the importance of the classroom as the quintes-
sential “marketplace of ideas”70 and the importance of exposing
our future leaders to “that robust exchange of ideas which discov-
ers truth ‘out of a multitude of tongues, [rather] than through any
kind of authoritative selection.’”71 Music curricula contribute to
the creation of this educational marketplace of ideas by “expand-
ing the knowledge and experience” of students.72 But, in order to
achieve this goal of expanding knowledge and experience, music
educators must enjoy academic freedom. Educators must be free
to present a representative study of all music—of which sacred
choral music is an integral part.73 Music educators have made a
professional judgment that sacred music is a necessary component
of a complete and accurate music education. Eliminating sacred
choral music devalues and disregards this professional judgment,
thwarting the goal of expanding knowledge and thereby diminish-
ing the marketplace of classroom ideas.
Menendez, supra note 60, at 241–42 (quoting Jean Caffey Lyles, onetime editor of Chris-
tian Century).
67. Id.
68. MENC 1996 Position Statement, supra note 62, at 2.
69. MENC 1984 Position Statement, supra note 59, at 29.
70. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1966).
71. Id. (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
72. MENC 1984 Position Statement, supra note 59, at 29.
73. See id.
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II. ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE PRECEDENT
A. Establishment Clause Tests
The archetypal interpretation of the Establishment Clause is
that it was intended to erect “a wall of separation between church
and State.”74 The Court has since reconsidered this concept of
complete separation, recognizing that a complete exclusion of
religion from all aspects of public life can sometimes conflict with
the Constitution’s vow to guard religious liberty.75 Instead, the
Constitution prohibits those practices that create the dangers the
First Amendment was designed to prevent—those practices which
involve the state in religious exercise.76
In attempting to distinguish those practices that create the
dangers the First Amendment was designed to prevent from those
practices that do not, the Supreme Court has used a variety of
approaches. Given the ambiguity in the text of the First Amend-
ment,77 and the “myriad, subtle ways in which Establishment
Clause values can be eroded,”78 this variety is not surprising. In-
deed, there is no single test that the Court uniformly applies in all
Establishment Clause cases.79 Rather, as Justice O’Connor has
explained, different categories of cases may require different ap-
proaches.80
74. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted).
75. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 598 (1992).
76. See id. (quoting School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 308 (1963) (Goldberg, J.,
concurring)).
77. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (noting that “the language
of . . . the First Amendment is at best opaque”); WILLIAM W. VAN ALSTYNE, FIRST
AMENDMENT CASES AND MATERIALS 855 (2d ed. 1995) (stating that “[t]he phrasing of
this part of the first amendment is somewhat awkward and ambiguous”).
Commentator Leo Pfeffer has noted that the Court “not only applies the rules but
interprets them, and since the rules basically consist of but sixteen words . . . the author-
ity is practically open-ended.” LEO PFEFFER, GOD, CAESAR, AND THE CONSTITUTION 25
(1975). Given this open-ended authority, in interpreting the text the Court seems more to
be making the rules than interpreting them. See id. at 30. Pfeffer has acknowledged the
difficulty of the Court’s position in light of the “cryptic incisiveness” of the text and the
“ever-multiplying and changing nature of the confrontations between religion and govern-
ment which the Court must resolve.” Id.
78. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 591 (1989) (quoting Lynch v.
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 694 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring)).
79. See id. (“not susceptible to a single verbal formulation”).
80. See Board of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 720–21 (1994) (O’Connor, J., con-
curring in part and concurring in the judgment) [hereinafter Kiryas Joel].
FILE:C:\WP51\DLJ\KASPARIA.PP Dec 12/06/97 Sat 10:47am
1997] TEACHING SACRED CHORAL MUSIC 1129
The Court has used two approaches that are especially appro-
priate for analyzing the Establishment Clause ramifications of
using sacred choral music in the public schools.81 The Court’s first
approach is the three-part test articulated in Lemon v. Kurtz-
man.82 Relying on past decisions,83 the Court stated that to sur-
vive a constitutional challenge, the government action at issue
must: 1) have a secular purpose; 2) have a principal or primary
effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion; and 3) “not fos-
ter an excessive government entanglement with religion.”84 Al-
though it has been strongly criticized by some members of the
Court,85 the Court recently noted that the Lemon test has never
81. In addition to the two approaches explained in this Note, the Court has used a
third approach, the “fusion” analysis articulated in Kiryas Joel, 512 U.S. at 699. In Kiryas
Joel, the Court held a New York statute creating a special school district for a religious
enclave to be unconstitutional. Relying on prior caselaw, the Court primarily considered
two factors: 1) whether the statute “brought about a fusion of governmental and religious
functions by delegating important, discretionary governmental powers to religious bodies,
thus impermissibly entangling government and religion”, id. at 696–97 (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted); and 2) whether there were “effective means of guaranteeing
that the delegated power [would] be used exclusively for secular, neutral, and nonideo-
logical purposes.” Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citations omit-
ted). This test is appropriate for a case such as Kiryas Joel where the government targets
a particular group and imposes special duties or provides special benefits. See id. at
719–21 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). This test
seems less appropriate for analyzing the use of sacred choral music in public schools,
which falls into the category of cases involving government speech on religious topics or
use of religious symbolism.
82. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
83. See id. at 612–13.
84. Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
85. In a sportive dissent to Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School
District, Justice Scalia has written:
As to the Court’s invocation of the Lemon test: Like some ghoul in a late-
night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after
being repeatedly killed and buried, Lemon stalks our Establishment Clause
jurisprudence once again, frightening little children and school attorneys . . . .
Its most recent burial, only last Term, was, to be sure, not fully six feet under:
Our decision in Lee v. Weisman conspicuously avoided using the supposed
“test” but also declined the invitation to repudiate it. Over the years, however,
no fewer than five of the currently sitting Justices have, in their own opinions,
personally driven pencils through the creature’s heart (the author of today’s
opinion repeatedly) . . . .
508 U.S. 384, 398 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (citation omitted); see also Kiryas Joel,
512 U.S. at 721 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“As
the Court’s opinion today shows, the slide away from Lemon’s unitary approach is well
under way.”). But see id. at 710 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (“I write separately only to
note my disagreement with any suggestion that today’s decision signals a departure from
the principles described in Lemon . . . .”).
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been overruled.86 Moreover, in a concurring opinion, Justice
Blackmun, joined by Justices Stevens and O’Connor, noted that
“[i]n no case involving religious activities in public schools has the
Court failed to apply vigorously the Lemon factors.”87 Given the
fact that Lemon has not been overruled and that it has been con-
sistently applied (or at least cited) in public school Establishment
Clause cases, the Lemon framework is appropriate for analyzing
the Establishment Clause ramifications of using sacred choral mu-
sic in public schools.
The Court’s second approach is the “endorsement” test, first
articulated in Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion in Lynch v.
Donnelly88 and applied by the Court in several later decisions.89
The “endorsement” test incorporates the purpose and effect prongs
of Lemon, considering “whether the challenged governmental
practice either has the purpose or effect of ‘endorsing’ religion.”90
Justice O’Connor has explained her focus on “endorsement” as
follows: “Endorsement sends a message to nonadherants that they
are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an
accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored
members of the political community.”91 In a subsequent decision,
a plurality of the Court elaborated:
Whether the key word is ‘endorsement,’ ‘favoritism,’ or ‘promo-
tion,’ the essential principle remains the same. The Establishment
Clause, at the very least, prohibits government from appearing to
86. See Lamb’s Chapel, 508 U.S. at 395 (finding a First Amendment free speech
violation when school district denied church’s request to use school facility for film show-
ing solely because film dealt with subject from religious standpoint and stating that “per-
mitting District property to be used to exhibit the film . . . would not have been an
establishment of religion under the three-part test articulated in Lemon”); Kiryas Joel,
512 U.S. at 710–11 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (declining to focus on Lemon framework
but citing the case as setting forth law and relying on decisions that explicitly rested on
Lemon criteria).
87. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 603 n.4 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
88. 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“I write separately to sug-
gest a clarification of our Establishment Clause doctrine.”).
89. See Capital Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 115 S. Ct. 2440, 2447
(1995) (plurality opinion) (referring to the “‘endorsement test’ which appears in our more
recent Establishment Clause jurisprudence”); Lamb’s Chapel, 508 U.S. at 395; Board of
Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 249–51 (1990) (opinion of O’Connor, J.); County of
Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 595–602 (1989) (plurality opinion); Wallace v. Jaffree,
472 U.S. 38, 56 (1985).
90. County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 592.
91. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
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take a position on questions of religious belief or from ‘making
adherence to a religion relevant in any way to a person’s stand-
ing in the political community.’92
The “endorsement” test has been particularly relevant in cases
involving the governmental display of religious symbols, such as
crèches and crosses.93 Because sacred choral music may be con-
sidered a form of expression involving religious symbolism,94 the
endorsement inquiry is also appropriate for analyzing the Estab-
lishment Clause ramifications of using sacred choral music in pub-
lic schools. The test evaluates the message that the government’s
practice communicates,95 inquiring what we “may fairly under-
stand to be the purpose” of the government’s use of the religious
symbol.96 As the word “fairly” indicates, the standard is objective,
considering the perceptions of the “reasonable observer.”97 In
92. County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 593–94 (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687
(O’Connor, J., concurring)).
93. See Pinette, 115 S. Ct. at 2447; County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 592; Lynch, 465
U.S. at 681.
94. Insofar as music is a symbol and sacred music has religious origins, sacred music
may be viewed as a form of religious symbolism.
95. See Pinette, 115 S. Ct. at 2454–55 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concur-
ring in the judgment) (noting that the standard for the endorsement test is that of the
“‘reasonable observer [who] evaluates whether a challenged governmental practice conveys
a message of endorsement of religion’”) (alteration in original) (citing County of Alleghe-
ny, 492 U.S. at 630 (O’Connor J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)).
96. County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 595; see also Pinette, 115 S. Ct. at 2458–59
(Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“Effects matter to the
Establishment Clause, and one, principal way that we assess them is by asking whether
the practice in question creates the appearance of endorsement to the reasonable observ-
er.”).
97. County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 620 (opinion of Blackmun, J.); see also Pinette,
115 S. Ct. at 2466 n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that in Allegheny five Justices
agreed that the appropriate standard is that of the reasonable observer); id. at 2455
(O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (analogizing reasonable
observer to the “reasonable person” in tort law who is not “‘any ordinary individual’”
but is “‘a personification of a community ideal of reasonable behavior, determined by the
[collective] social judgment.’”) (alteration in original) (citing W. KEETON ET AL., PROSSER
AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 175 (5th ed. 1984)); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S.
577, 597 (1992) (“We do not hold that every state action implicating religion is invalid if
one or a few citizens find it offensive.”).
However, as Capitol Square Review and Advisory Board v. Pinette demonstrates,
although there is agreement that the standard is that of the reasonable observer, there is
disagreement within the Court as to the quantum of knowledge that should be attributed
to the reasonable observer. See id. at 2454–55 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and con-
curring in the judgment). Some members of the Court would attribute to the reasonable
observer a collective knowledge of history and context of the community and forum in
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making this inquiry, context—the particular setting of the dis-
play—becomes crucial.98 For example, a plurality of the Court has
explained: “[A] typical museum setting, though not neutralizing the
religious content of a religious painting, negates any message of
endorsement of that content. . . . Every government practice must
be judged in its unique circumstances to determine whether it
[endorses] religion.”99 In summary, the plurality held that, under
the “endorsement” test, the government’s use of religious symbol-
ism is unconstitutional if it has the effect of endorsing religion,
and that the “effect” is dependent on the context.100
Comparison of the Lemon and “endorsement” tests reveals
that aspects of the tests overlap. Both tests consider the pur-
pose—actual or perceived—and the effect of the government ac-
tion.101 It has been argued that the Lemon test has been re-
phrased with “endorsement” language and that the “endorsement”
test seems essentially to be a restatement of the first and second
Lemon criteria.102 In addition, when analyzing Establishment
which a governmental display appears. See Pinette, 115 S. Ct. at 2455–56 (O’Connor, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Justice Stevens, however, would not
attribute such collective community knowledge to the reasonable observer and would find
an Establishment Clause violation “[i]f a reasonable person could perceive a government
endorsement of religion from a private display.” Id. at 2466 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (em-
phasis added).
98. See County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 595 (plurality opinion).
99. Id. at 595 (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 694 (O’Connor, J., concurring)).
100. Id. at 597.
101. Although the Lemon test also considers the “entanglement” factor, that factor is
not particularly instructive in analyzing the three hypotheticals in this Note involving the
use of sacred choral music in public schools. Entanglement has been interpreted as state
involvement in the power structure of a religious organization. Sacred choral music in
public schools could conceivably raise entanglement issues if, for example, a school music
teacher were also the minister of music or organist at a church, and had the school choir
perform during church services. However, entanglement is not the crucial factor in most
cases involving sacred choral music. Lower court precedent addressing sacred choral mu-
sic illustrates the limited applicability of the entanglement factor; courts have found en-
tanglement only when they have found the effect of the government practice is a reli-
gious exercise. In other words, they have found entanglement insofar as state actors are
involved in directing that religious exercise. See infra Section II.C.
102. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
The central issue in this case is whether Pawtucket has endorsed Christianity by
its display of the creche. To answer that question, we must examine both what
Pawtucket intended to communicate in displaying the creche and what message
the city’s display actually conveyed. The purpose and effect prongs of the Lem-
on test represent these two aspects of the meaning of the city’s action.
Id. See also Underkuffler-Freund, supra note 4, at 969 (quoting Wallace v. Jaffree, 472
U.S. 38, 70 (1985) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“Recently, the first two prongs of [the
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Clause issues, the Court has often combined Lemon factors with
“endorsement” language.103 In some cases, the Court seems
merely to have cited the opinions from which the tests are drawn,
but not to have applied the factors. Regardless of the name of the
test applied, however, the relevant Supreme Court Establishment
Clause precedent demonstrates an emphasis on both the purpose
and effect of the government action at issue.
B. Relevant Applications
Although there is no direct Supreme Court statement on the
use of sacred choral music in public schools, there is related Su-
preme Court precedent that bears on the issue, as well as directly
relevant lower court precedent. In order to predict how the Court
would rule on the constitutionality of the use of sacred music in
public schools, it is useful then to explore the relevant caselaw.
1. Supreme Court Precedent. In School District of Abington
Township v. Schempp,104 the Supreme Court found state-directed
devotional Bible reading unconstitutional as a state-directed
religious exercise. Although the decision predates the articulation
of the Lemon and the endorsement tests, it too analyzes both the
purpose and effect of the government action at issue. In analyzing
the purpose of the state rule requiring daily Bible reading in
public schools, the Court rejected the legislature’s avowed secular
purpose—“promotion of moral values, the contradiction to the
materialistic trends of our times, the perpetuation of our
Lemon] test have been reframed in the terms of ‘endorsement’: the law or practice, to
survive scrutiny, must not ‘convey a message that religion or a particular religious belief
is favored or preferred.’”)).
103. See Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. at 226, 248–49 (1990) (Equal Access
Act’s purpose was not to “endorse or disapprove of religion” (quoting Wallace, 472 U.S.
at 56)); see also Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 593 (1987) (rephrasing Lemon’s first
factor in terms of endorsement); Wallace, 472 U.S. at 56 (same).
This approach has been used by lower courts addressing the Establishment Clause
ramifications of sacred choral music in public schools; these courts have conflated the
Lemon and “endorsement” tests by rephrasing the first and second Lemon factors and
asking instead “whether the challenged government action was intended to endorse or
has the effect of endorsing religion.” Bauchman v. West High Sch., No. 95-C–506G, 1996
WL 407856, at *3 (D. Utah May 30, 1996) (quoting Robinson v. City of Edmond, 68
F.3d 1226, 1229 (10th Cir. 1995)); see also Doe v. Duncanville Indep. Sch. Dist., 70 F.3d
402, 405, 406–08 (using several approaches including Lemon test, endorsement test, and
what court deems “coercive effect” test of Weisman).
104. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
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institutions and the teaching of literature.”105 The Court implied
that, even if the legislature’s true purpose was nonreligious, the
effect of “readings, without comment, from the Bible” had a
pervading religious character that made the government action
unconstitutional.106 In so holding, the Court weighed heavily the
effect or perceived purpose of the activity, emphasizing factors that
demonstrated the religious context of the activity, including the
rule’s granting of specific permission to use an alternative Catholic
version of the Bible and specific permission for nonattendance.107
The Court found that these factors were not consistent “with the
contention that the Bible is here used either as an instrument for
nonreligious moral inspiration or as a reference for the teaching of
secular subjects.”108
The Court did qualify its holding in Schempp, stating that
using the Bible without such a religious context in an objective
presentation of the Bible or of religion, as part of a secular pro-
gram of education, would be constitutional.109
[I]t might well be said that one’s education is not complete with-
out a study of comparative religion or the history of religion and
its relationship to the advancement of civilization. It certainly
may be said that the Bible is worthy of study for its literary and
historic qualities. Nothing we have said indicates that such study
of the Bible or of religion when presented objectively as part of
a secular program of education, may not be effected consistently
with the First Amendment.110
This statement underscores the importance of context in determin-
ing whether the state’s use of material with religious content—such
as the Bible or sacred music—constitutes unconstitutional “reli-
gious exercise” or constitutional study.111
105. Id. at 223.
106. Id. at 224 (emphasis added).
107. See id.
108. Id.
109. See id. at 225; see also Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 42 (1980) (striking statute
mandating posting of Ten Commandments on school walls and stating, “This is not a
case in which the Ten Commandments are integrated into the school curriculum, where
the Bible may constitutionally be used in an appropriate study of history, civilization,
ethics, comparative religion, or the like.” (citing Schempp, 374 U.S. at 225)).
110. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 225. The Schempp Court distinguished studying the Bible
as literature or history from the state-directed, devotional Bible reading at issue in the
case, holding that the latter devotional use to be a “religious exercise”. Id.
111. The Court similarly relied on context in analyzing the “effect” factor in Lamb’s
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Similarly, in Stone v. Graham,112 the Supreme Court de-
clared unconstitutional a statute that required the posting of a
copy of the Ten Commandments on the wall of each public class-
room in the state.113 The Court again rejected the legislature’s
avowed secular purpose—demonstrating the connection between
the Ten Commandments and the common law. The Court rejected
this purpose, despite the fact that a statement making this connec-
tion appeared on each display.114 In rejecting the asserted pur-
pose, the Court relied on the effect or perceived purpose of the
display, which the Court deemed “plainly religious in nature.”115
The Court stated:
The Ten Commandments are undeniably a sacred text in the
Jewish and Christian faiths, and no legislative recitation of a
supposed secular purpose can blind us to that fact. . . . Posting
of religious texts on the wall serves no such educational function.
If the posted copies of the Ten Commandments are to have any
effect at all, it will be to induce the schoolchildren to read, medi-
tate upon, perhaps to venerate and obey, the Command-
ments. . . . it is not a permissible state objective under the Estab-
lishment Clause.116
In County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union,117
the Supreme Court, citing Lemon as well as the “endorsement”
test, considered whether two town displays had the effect of en-
dorsing religion.118 In doing so, the Court emphasized the impor-
tance of context in determining whether the displays had the effect
of endorsement. Using the standard of a reasonable observer, the
Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District, 508 U.S. 384, 395 (1993). In
Lamb’s Chapel, the Court held that permitting public school property to be used, consis-
tent with the Equal Access Act, by a church to show a religious film would not be an
establishment of religion. See id. at 395. The Court found several contextual factors, in-
cluding the time of the film showing—after school hours—and that the showing would be
open to the public, that helped the Court to determine that there was “no realistic dan-
ger that the community would think that the District was endorsing religion.” Id.
112. 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
113. See id. at 42–43.
114. See id. at 41 (noting the statement required on each display: “The secular appli-
cation of the Ten Commandments is clearly seen in its adoption as the fundamental legal
code of Western Civilization and the Common Law of the United States.”).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 41–42 (footnotes omitted).
117. 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
118. See id. at 578.
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Court carefully analyzed the particular aspects of each physical
setting.119 The Court found unconstitutional a display of a crèche,
located on the Grand Staircase of the county courthouse, which in-
cluded an angel bearing a banner proclaiming, “Gloria in Excelsis
Deo!”120 The Court explained that nothing in the setting detract-
ed from the crèche’s religious message.121 In contrast, the Court
found constitutional a display, outside the City-County Building, of
a menorah next to a Christmas tree, accompanied by an explana-
tory sign saluting liberty.122 The explanatory sign, entitled “Salute
to Liberty,” stated: “During this holiday season, the city of Pitts-
burgh salutes liberty. Let these festive lights remind us that we are
the keepers of the flame of liberty and our legacy of free-
dom.”123 While the sign was not the only controlling factor in the
decision, the presence of the sign was significant for at least one
member of the Court: “The mayor’s sign further diminishes the
possibility that the tree and the menorah will be interpreted as a
dual endorsement of Christianity and Judaism. . . . [A]n ‘explana-
tory plaque’ may confirm that in particular contexts the govern-
ment’s association with a religious symbol does not represent the
government’s sponsorship of religious beliefs.”124
119. See id. at 595, 620.
120. See id. at 580 (“Glory to God in the Highest”).
121. See id. at 598–602.
122. Id. at 613–21.
123. Id. at 582 (quoting Joint Exhibit Volume 41).
124. Id. at 619 (Blackmun, J., concurring). The Court has noted that similar state-
ments by the government can negate the effect of endorsement. See Widmar v. Vincent,
454 U.S. 263, 273, 274 n.14 (1981) (providing equal access to university facilities for stu-
dent groups, including religious student groups, does not have effect of advancing religion
especially in light of fact that student handbook explains that university is not to be
identified with the aims or policies of any student organization).
Members of the Court have also encouraged the use of explanatory statements to
negate any perceptions of endorsement. In Board of Education v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226
(1990), the Court found that giving equal access to high school student religious groups
would not violate the Establishment Clause. See id. at 253 (O’Connor, J., concurring)
(joined by Rehnquist, C.J., White and Blackmun, J.J.). The Court explained that a rea-
sonable observer would not perceive the school to be endorsing religion by granting this
equal access and added that the school could take steps to ensure that there would be
no misperception. See id. at 251. O’Connor’s concurrence stated that the fear
of a mistaken inference of endorsement is largely self-imposed, because the
school itself has control over any impressions it gives its students. To the extent
that a school makes clear that its recognition of respondents’ proposed club is
not an endorsement . . . students will reasonably understand that the school’s
official recognition of the club evinces neutrality toward, rather than endorse-
ment of, religious speech.
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The Court did not foreclose the possibility that such a display
could have the effect of endorsing religion—as it might, for exam-
ple, if the menorah were lit in conjunction with the recitation of
religious blessings—but explained that given the particular context,
the display did not have the effect of endorsing religion.125
In Engel v. Vitale,126 the Court declared state-directed prayer
in public schools to be violative of the Establishment Clause, rely-
ing on the undeniably “religious nature” of prayer recognized by
Thomas Jefferson, theological writers, and the Court.127 The
Court explained:
There can, of course, be no doubt that New York’s program of
daily classroom invocation of God’s blessings as prescribed in the
Regents’ prayer is a religious activity. It is a solemn avowal of
divine faith and supplication for the blessings of the Almighty.
The nature of such a prayer has always been religious.128
In Lee v. Weisman,129 the Court held that inviting clerical
members to offer nonsectarian prayers as part of school graduation
ceremonies was an unconstitutional act under the Establishment
Clause.130 Members of the Weisman Court also referred to
Engel’s “always . . . religious” definition of prayer.131
The Court found that by tacitly encouraging standing or silence
during the rabbi’s invocation and benediction,132 the state re-
Id. See also Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 115 S. Ct. 2440, 2450
(1995) (Scalia, J., concurring) (joined by Rehnquist, C.J., Kennedy and Thomas, J.J.)
(finding no endorsement of religion where state permitted the Ku Klux Klan, a private
party, to display cross on grounds of state capitol, a public forum, and stating, “[i]f [the
state] is concerned about misperceptions, nothing prevents it from requiring all private
displays in the Square to be identified as such”).
125. See County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 620–21.
126. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
127. Id. at 425 (“The religious nature of prayer was recognized by Jefferson and has
been concurred in by theological writers [and] the United States Supreme Court.”) (quot-
ing trial court).
128. Id. at 424–25.
129. 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
130. See id. at 599.
131. Id. at 603 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
132. The invocation read:
God of the Free, Hope of the Brave:
For the legacy of America where diversity is celebrated and the rights of
minorities are protected, we thank You. May these young men and women
grow up to enrich it.
For the liberty of America, we thank You. May these new graduates
grow up to guard it.
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quired participation in a “religious exercise.”133 Instead of apply-
ing a particular test, the Court analogized the facts to the state-di-
rected prayer recitation that was declared unconstitutional in
Engel.134 The Court emphasized that the state had directed and
controlled the content of the prayers, by inviting a rabbi to give a
nonsectarian prayer and by providing him with a pamphlet con-
taining guidelines for the composition of public prayers at civic
ceremonies,135 in finding that the government’s involvement with
the religious activity was pervasive “to the point of creating a
state-sponsored and state-directed religious exercise in a public
school.”136
2. Lower Court Decisions. Although the Supreme Court has
never addressed the Establishment Clause ramifications of teaching
and performing sacred choral music in public schools, several
lower courts have confronted the issue.137 In addressing the issue,
For the political process of America in which all its citizens may partici-
pate, for its court system where all may seek justice we thank You. May those
we honor this morning always turn to it in trust.
For the destiny of America we thank You. May the graduates of Nathan
Bishop Middle School so live that they might share it.
May our aspirations for our country and for these young people, who are




O God, we are grateful to You for having endowed us with the capacity for
learning which we have celebrated on this joyous commencement.
Happy families give thanks for seeing their children achieve an important mile-
stone. Send Your blessings upon the teachers and administrators who helped
prepare them.
The graduates now need strength and guidance for the future, help them to
understand that we are not complete with academic knowledge alone. We must
each strive to fulfill what You require of us all: To do justly, to love mercy, to
walk humbly.
We give thanks to You, Lord, for keeping us alive, sustaining us and allowing
us to reach this special, happy occasion.
AMEN.
Id. at 582.
133. Id. at 593, 599 (stating that a student who stood or remained silent during the
prayer could believe that the group exercise “signified her own participation or approval
of it,” rather than “mere respect” of it). Although objecting students did have the choice
of protesting, the Court found that this choice was not acceptable given the susceptibility
of adolescents to conform due to peer pressure. See id. at 593–94.
134. See id. at 596–97 (citing Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430 (1962)).
135. See id.
136. Id. at 587.
137. See infra notes 138–90 and accompanying text; see also Sease v. School Dist., 811
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lower courts have used a variety of approaches, including the
purpose, effect, and entanglement factors of Lemon test, as well as
the purpose and effect factors of the Lemon test rephrased in
terms of endorsement.
In Doe v. Aldine Independent School District,138 a Texas fed-
eral district court, applying Lemon, found state-directed recitation
and singing of a school prayer violative of the Establishment
Clause.139 The prayer140 was posted on the gymnasium wall and
either recited or sung at various school activities at the initiation
of the principal or other school employees.141 The court held that
the words met the Engel Court’s definition of “prayer,” because
the words invoked divine blessing and contained an avowal of
divine faith.142 In so holding, the court found no constitutional
distinction between the singing or recitation of the prayer and
referred alternatively to the prayer as a “school prayer” and as a
“school song.”143 In analyzing the Lemon purpose factor, the
court found that the stated purpose—to instill school spirit and
pride which increases morale and lessens disciplinary prob-
lems—could be achieved through nonreligious means.144 As such,
the court determined that reciting and singing the prayer did not
have a secular purpose.145 The court also determined that the
practice advanced religion because the state-directed recitation or
singing of the prayer at pep rallies, football games, and graduation
ceremonies indicated that the state advocated religious belief.146
Also, because school employees directed the practice on school
property, the court found that the recitation and singing of the
prayer involved excessive entanglement with religion.147
F. Supp. 183 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (finding non-curriculum gospel choir in violation of Equal
Access Act by engaging in school-sponsored religious activities).
138. 563 F. Supp. 883 (S.D. Tex. 1982)
139. See id.
140. The text of the prayer was: “Dear God, please bless our school and all it stands
for. Help keep us free from sin, honest and true, courage and faith to make our school
the victor. In Jesus’ name we pray, Amen.” Id. at 884 (internal quotation marks omit-
ted).
141. See id. at 885.
142. See id.
143. Id. at 885–86.
144. See id. at 886.
145. See id.
146. See id. at 887.
147. See id. at 887–88.
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In Florey v. Sioux Falls School District,148 the Eighth Circuit
supported the constitutionality of singing Christmas carols in public
schools by upholding school district rules that permitted the objec-
tive presentation of sacred music for school-sponsored activities
and programs and the objective study of sacred music within the
curriculum as constitutional.149 Applying the three factors of the
Lemon test, and relying on Schempp’s statement that the objective
study of religion as part of a secular program of education is per-
missible, the Court found the rules constitutional.150 In finding
the purpose of the rules—to teach the role of religion in the so-
cial, cultural, and historical development of civilization—to be a
legitimate, secular purpose, the court distinguished the purpose of
the state-directed prayer in Engel and the state-directed Bible
reading in Schempp.151 In determining that the effect of the rules
did not advance or inhibit religion, the court specifically found
that the term “study” included more than classroom instruction
and encompassed public performance.152 As such, the court
found that the singing of Christmas carols in accordance with the
school department rules would have a primarily secular effect.153
The court also relied on the cultural significance of Christmas
carols in determining that the effect of singing the carols would be
primarily secular.154 Finally, in addressing the third Lemon factor,
the Court found that rather than fostering an excessive state en-
tanglement of religion, the school department rules provided
means to ensure that schools would not engage in “religious exer-
cises.”155
More recently, in Doe v. Duncanville Independent School
District,156 the Fifth Circuit found a public school choir’s designa-
tion of John Rutter’s The Lord Bless You and Keep You as the
choir’s theme song to be constitutional.157 The song was recog-
nized by students as the theme song but was not demarcated as
148. 619 F.2d 1311 (8th Cir. 1980).
149. See id.
150. See id. at 1313–18.
151. See id. at 1314–15.
152. See id. at 1316.
153. See id. at 1315–18, 1319.
154. See id. at 1315–18.
155. Id. at 1318.
156. 70 F.3d 402 (5th Cir. 1995).
157. See id. at 401–08.
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such in the one concert program in the record.158 The choir sang
the theme song at the end of performances, at the end of class on
Fridays, during choral competitions, and on bus rides home from
performances.159 The parties acknowledged the constitutional per-
missibility, under Schempp, of singing sacred choral music as part
of a secular music program.160 However, there was a dispute as
to whether treating the song as theme song, rather than merely
one in the repertoire, transforms the permissible practice into an
“endorsement” of religion.161
Citing the Lemon test, the endorsement test, and Lee v.
Weisman, the Fifth Circuit analyzed the case using a combined
Lemon/endorsement approach, considering whether there was a
secular purpose to the practice and whether the practice effectively
endorsed religion.162 Citing the choir director’s opinion that The
Lord Bless You and Keep You is useful in teaching students to
sight-read and to sing without instrumental accompaniment, the
court stated that there was a legitimate secular purpose in main-
taining the song as theme song.163 The court found that labelling
The Lord Bless You and Keep You as theme song did not
effectively endorse religion because of the predominance of sacred
music within the repertoire of choral music.164 The court also
stated that singing the theme song was not a religious exercise and
distinguished Aldine on the basis that Aldine involved a school-
composed prayer sung before athletic events rather than the wide-
ly recognized choral music at issue in Duncanville.165 The court
rejected the relevance of the fact that students would identify their
choir by the theme song because of the crucial point that in the
world of choral music, “singing about religion is not the same as
endorsing or exercising religion.”166 Since singing the theme song
was not a “religious exercise,” the court determined there was no
excessive entanglement with religion.167
158. See id. at 407 n.6.
159. See id. at 404.
160. See id. at 407.
161. See id.
162. See id. at 405–08.
163. See id. at 407.
164. See id. at 407–08.
165. See id. at 407 n.7.
166. See id. at 407–08 nn.7–8.
167. See id. at 408 n.7.
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In Bauchman v. West High School,168 a Utah federal district
court dismissed an Establishment Clause claim involving a public
school choir’s performance of sacred choral music by contemporary
Christian songwriters, including Rutter’s The Lord Bless You and
Keep You, in several churches, for failure to state facts supporting
a constitutional violation.169 The court distinguished Lee v.
Weisman and applied the Lemon factors.170 The court distin-
guished Weisman on the basis that singing sacred music is not a
“religious exercise” and that sacred music is not the equivalent of
prayer.171
The Bauchman court then applied the three factors of the
Lemon test.172 First, the court found that the choir director’s se-
lection of contemporary Christian music and religious performance
sites had a primarily secular purpose—that of teaching broad musi-
cal appreciation and increasing awareness of culture and diversi-
ty.173 The plaintiff argued that, while performing sacred choral
music of a particular quality might be constitutionally permissible
because of its significance within the Western music tradition and
culture, performance of low quality sacred music, such as the con-
temporary music at issue in the case, would not be constitutionally
permissible.174 This lack of musical quality, the plaintiff argued,
demonstrated a religious motive in the selection of the music.175
The court rejected this argument, finding that it would be imprac-
ticable for courts to evaluate the constitutionality of sacred choral
music on the basis of high or low musical quality.176 Second, the
court determined that the primary effect was not the advancement
or inhibition of religion, but rather, the teaching of musical skills
and appreciation.177 Third, the court found that there was no ex-
cessive entanglement by the state with religion given the fact that
any selection of choral music will entail involvement with religion
168. 900 F. Supp. 254 (D. Utah 1995).
169. See id.
170. See id. at 267–69.
171. See id. at 268.
172. See id. at 268–69.
173. See id. at 269.
174. See id. at 268 n.18.
175. See id.
176. See id.
177. See id. at 269.
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due to the pervasive role of sacred music within the repertoire of
choral music.178
After the case was dismissed, the plaintiff moved to amend
her claim; this motion was also dismissed.179 In considering the
allegations in the plaintiff’s motion, the court applied the first two
factors of the Lemon test, rephrased with endorsement language,
considering whether, under the standard of a reasonable observer,
there was a purpose to endorse or the effect of endorsing reli-
gion.180 The court found no purpose to endorse religion despite
the choir director’s selection of contemporary Christian music and
his statements, such as “I don’t believe in leaving my religion at
home”181 and “I’m just a religious man. It’s just a part of my life
that I can’t ignore.”182 In addition, the court again rejected the
argument that the low musical quality of the selections demon-
strated a purpose to endorse religion, declining to conduct an
aesthetic analysis of the sacred music selected by the choir direc-
tor.183
The court similarly found no endorsement of religion.184 The
court rejected the argument that the choir director’s teaching style
had the effect of endorsing religion, despite the fact that in re-
hearsal he instructed the class to “feel the music, listen to the
words, don’t just sing it without thinking about the words.”185
The court noted that the choir director never told the choir to
believe the lyrics or to believe the message of the lyrics, that he
never talked to the choir about religion, and that he never told
the choir he was a Mormon nor encouraged students to become
Mormons or Christians.186 The court found that the choir
director’s comments at the year’s final concert, presented in a
church, thanking his “‘heavenly father’ for ‘the opportunity in
working with these young people’” did not have the effect of
endorsing religion.187 In so finding, the court relied on the affida-
178. See id.
179. See Bauchman v. West High Sch., Civ. No. 95-C–506G, 1996 WL 407856 (D.
Utah May 30, 1996).
180. See id. at *3–*9.
181. Id. at *4.
182. Id. at *9.
183. See id. at *6 nn.43–44.
184. See id. at *9.
185. Id. at *7.
186. See id. at *7–*8.
187. Id. at *8.
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vit of a student who perceived the statements not as a prayer but
as “an emotional speech . . . at the end of the school year” and
“his own personal statement.”188 The court also rejected the ar-
gument that the performance of sacred choral music and Christmas
carols in December had the effect of endorsing religion, empha-
sizing that these performances were not in conjunction with reli-
gious services.189 In addition, the court stated that the choir’s
performances in churches or other religious sites did not have the
effect of endorsing religion, again emphasizing that such perfor-
mances were concerts and not in conjunction with religious servic-
es.190
C. Framework for Analyzing Sacred Choral Music in Public
Schools
With this Establishment Clause precedent in mind, this Note
analyzes sacred choral music issues using a combined Lem-
on/endorsement approach, rephrasing the first two Lemon factors,
purpose and effect, in endorsement terms. This analysis asks two
questions: First, is there a purpose to endorse religion? And sec-
ond, is there an effective (i.e., reasonably perceived) endorsement
of religion? Despite the apparent coequal status of these two fac-
tors, this Note seeks to demonstrate that in analyzing the use of
sacred music in public schools, the question of purpose is of little
utility, and that the controlling inquiry is instead that of “per-
ceived purpose” or “effect”. And in considering the effect, the
proper inquiry, as the Court explained in County of Allegheny and
Lynch, is “what viewers may fairly understand to be the purpose”
of the state’s use of religious symbolism; this inquiry will depend
upon context.191 Because the extant Establishment Clause tests
have proved malleable and seem capable of yielding inconsistent
results,192 this Note will not utilize a mechanical application of
188. Id.
189. See id. at *5.
190. See id. at *4.
191. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 595 (1989) (citing Lynch v.
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 692 (1984)).
192. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 795 (1983) (upholding state legislative
practice of beginning each session with prayer by a chaplain chosen biennially by the
Executive Board of the Legislative Council and paid out of public funds). But see Kiryas
Joel, 512 U.S. 687, 720 (1994) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[c]ourts tend to continually
try to patch up the broad test, making it more and more amorphous and distorted. This,
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factors. Rather, this Note will focus on relevant analogous and
distinguishable facts of relevant Supreme Court Establishment
Clause cases in analyzing the constitutionality of teaching and
performing sacred choral music in three hypothetical public school
contexts.193
III. ANALYZING THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE RAMIFICATIONS
OF SACRED CHORAL MUSIC IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS
IN SPECIFIC CONTEXTS
A. Teaching and Performance
A high school choral director selects excerpts from Handel’s
Messiah194 for the December chorus concert. Her primary moti-
vation in selecting the work is because of its historical significance
and because it will expose the students to collaboration with or-
chestra. She discusses this historical significance with the choir and
explains that it is because of this significance that she has selected
the piece. However, the teacher is Christian and, as such, she
hopes in her inner heart of hearts that, after exposure to Handel’s
Messiah, students will be so moved by the music that they will em-
brace the underlying message of the text and become Christians.
During the course of rehearsal, she encourages students to “feel
the music.” She never discusses religion; she does not pray and
she does not explicitly or implicitly encourage students to join a
particular faith. For the concert, she writes program notes that
articulate the historical background and musical significance of the
piece. Is this use of sacred choral music constitutional?
I am afraid, has happened with Lemon.”); Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union
Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. at 384, 399 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“The secret of the
Lemon test’s survival, I think, is that it is so easy to kill. It is there to scare us (and
our audience) when we wish it to do so, but we can command it to return to the tomb
at will. When we wish to strike down a practice it forbids, we invoke it, when we wish
to uphold a practice it forbids, we ignore it entirely. Sometimes, we take a middle
course, calling its three prongs ‘no more than helpful signposts.’ . . . For my part, I
agree with the long list of constitutional scholars who have criticized Lemon and be-
moaned the strange Establishment Clause geometry of crooked lines and wavering shapes
its intermittent use has produced.” (citations omitted)); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577,
586–99 (1992) (holding unconstitutional the practice of allowing school-selected member of
clergy to present prayer at high school graduation ceremony).
193. See Kiryas Joel, 512 U.S. at 719 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[I]t is more useful
to recognize the relevant concerns in each case on their own terms.”).
194. George F. Handel, MESSIAH (Watkins Shaw ed., 1981).
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In applying the “purpose” factor of the Lemon-endorsement
inquiry, a court would consider the choral director’s subjective
purpose in using Handel’s Messiah. In Lemon language, a “legit-
imate secular purpose”—educating students about a musically
significant work and developing the collaborative skill of working
with orchestra—is present. Lower courts, commentators, and music
educators have all noted that sacred choral music comprises a
majority of the choral literature in existence; in fact, many have
argued that such music is some of the best in the literature.195
In this hypothetical example, however, the teacher has mixed
motives—secular and religious—for selecting Handel’s Messiah.
Given that a legitimate secular purpose may fairly be understood,
of what legal relevance, if any, is the teacher’s inner, and un-
voiced, religious motive? In several cases, the Supreme Court has
indicated that the subjective intentions of state actors are relevant
to Establishment Clause analysis. The Court has consistently at-
tempted to separate the religious and secular “motivations” of
state actors.196 In Edwards, for instance, the Court rejected the
secular purpose avowed by the state because it deemed the actual
and perceived purposes of legislators to be religious: “While the
Court is normally deferential to a State’s articulation of a secular
purpose, it is required that the statement of such purpose be sin-
cere and not a sham.”197 The Court seems to have discounted
the importance of the articulated nonreligious purpose, because it
determined that the perceived purpose—or effect—was in fact reli-
gious.
Although consideration of legislative purpose might be appro-
priate in some cases, the use of subjective purpose as a determina-
tive factor in the context of using sacred music in public schools is
problematic. First, the task of distilling a pure secular or religious
motivation is impossible.198 As one commentator has argued,
“The purity of separation of religious and secular motivations
within individuals is simply an actual and analytical impossibili-
ty.”199 Second, consideration of the teacher’s unvoiced motive
195. See supra note 62.
196. See Underkuffler-Freund, supra note 4, at 859.
197. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 586–87; see also supra text accompanying
notes 105–16.
198. See Underkuffler-Freund, supra note 4, at 865 n.109 (noting Justice Scalia’s com-
ments regarding the multiplicity of legislative motivations).
199. Id.
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would produce absurd or inconsistent results. It would be absurd
to hold that the performance of an entirely secular music program
would be unconstitutional because the instructor harbored religious
motivations or aspirations in its selection. If the music were sacred
in nature, the use of purpose as a determinative factor would
create other difficulties. Assuming an identical set of facts, it does
not make sense that the same teaching and performance context
would be constitutional absent religious motivation but unconstitu-
tional if an unvoiced religious motivation were present.
Perhaps based on these reasons, the court in Bauchman seems
to have discounted the “purpose” factor.200 In applying the pur-
pose factor of a rephrased Lemon/endorsement test, the court
found no violation of the Establishment Clause, although the mu-
sic teacher who used sacred music acknowledged, “I have a little
trouble with this separationist concept” and “I don’t believe in
leaving my religion at home.”201 With these statements, the court
could not have truly weighed the “purpose” factor and still found
no violation of the Establishment Clause. What should be—and
what seems to be—more determinative of constitutionality is not
the state’s actual purpose but the “perceived” purpose—or the
effect—of using the music.202
The crucial inquiry carefully considers how the music teacher
uses the music, by analyzing the context of the use. That the con-
text of the teaching and performing of sacred choral music is cru-
cial is evident in the language of those cases where the Court has
rejected an avowed secular purpose.203 Although the Court con-
sidered purpose in those cases, the Court concentrated on the
200. See Bauchman v. West High Sch., Civ. No. 95-C–506G, 1996 WL 407856, at *4,
*9 (D. Utah May 30, 1996).
201. Id.
202. This view finds support in Justice Stevens’ dissenting opinion in Mergens. Justice
Stevens explained that in analyzing Lemon’s purpose prong, the crucial inquiry is whether
the government action at issue “reflects a judgment that it would be desirable for people
to be religious or to adhere to a particular religion. The plurality is correct to observe
that it is irrelevant whether the legislature itself behaved religiously when it made (or
abstained from making) that judgment.” Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 286
n.21 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting). As the language “reflects a judgment” indicates, the
effect is determinative. The relevant aspect of the purpose inquiry—the perceived pur-
pose—whether the government action reflects a judgment that it is desirable to be reli-
gious, is subsumed in the effect analysis, which considers the message the government
practice communicates.
203. See Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 42 (1980); School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S.
203, 224 (1963).
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context of accompanying state legislation or state action.204 It fol-
lows that, in considering the constitutionality of teaching and per-
forming sacred choral music in public schools, it is the “effect” or
“perceived purpose” factor, analyzed in terms of context, that is
most probative.205
Thus, in applying the “effect” factor, consideration of whether
the use of Messiah in this hypothetical has the effect of endorsing
religion requires analysis of the context of the choral director’s
use. In this hypothetical, the context of the rehearsal and perfor-
mance do not have the effect of endorsing religion. There are
several factors that might contribute to the context of a perfor-
mance, and that indicate that this hypothetical performance does
not have the effect of endorsing religion. These include the site
and time of year of the concert, the placement of particular selec-
tions within the order of the program, the presence of program
notes explaining the musical significance of works performed, and
the nature of performative artifice.
As the Supreme Court has noted, a “typical museum setting,
though not neutralizing the religious content of a religious paint-
ing, negates any message of endorsement of that content.”206
Similarly, even if a piece of sacred choral music was originally
composed for use in a worship service,207 the use of that music
204. See supra text accompanying notes 104–16 (discussing Schempp, 374 U.S. at 224
(striking state-directed Bible reading and holding that use of Bible at issue was not for
nonreligious moral inspiration or as reference for teaching of secular subjects); Stone, 449
U.S. at 42 (striking mandatory posting of Ten Commandments on school walls and stat-
ing, “[t]his is not a case in which the Ten Commandments are integrated into the school
curriculum, where the Bible may constitutionally be used in an appropriate study of
history.”); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 619 (1989) (finding display of
menorah and Christmas tree constitutional in part because of presence of explanatory
sign saluting liberty)); see also Steven B. Epstein, Rethinking the Constitutionality of Cere-
monial Deism, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 2083, 2132 (1996) (“Most of the laws and practices
the Supreme Court has found to violate the Establishment Clause have been invalidated
under Lemon’s or the endorsement test’s effect prong.”) (citing Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S.
421 (1962); Schempp, 374 U.S. at 203; County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 573; Lee v.
Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992)).
205. See supra notes 106–25 and accompanying text (discussing Court’s language em-
phasizing context).
206. County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 595 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668,
692 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring)).
207. Handel’s Messiah is not such a piece; it was originally intended for concert hall
performance and was so performed during Handel’s life. See LEONARD VAN CAMP, A
PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR PERFORMING, TEACHING AND SINGING MESSIAH 4 (1993) (not-
ing that during Handel’s life Messiah was performed “36 times, always in March, April,
or May and never in a church.”).
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in a true performative context, and outside the worship service,
negates any message of endorsement. The very nature of the
word—performance—connotes theatrical artifice. Theatrical perfor-
mance, including this hypothetical concert, involves “training, re-
hearsal, and planning on the part of its producers,”208 and, on
the part of its audience, requires “a sustained imaginative collusion
with the events portrayed by the actors.”209 The key word here is
imagination: the reasonable audience member can be expected to
use their imagination to engage in the performance, rather than
impute to the performer belief or endorsement of the message of
every piece performed in a concert. Historically, theatrical per-
formance has been criticized for its disclaimer of reality; such per-
formance is said to be based on “hypocrisy,” where the performers
feign and fictionalize, attempting “to substitute ‘notorious lying
fables,’ . . . for things that have truly happened.”210 Lower courts
have emphasized this notion of performative artifice in finding that
performances of sacred music in public schools do not necessarily
endorse religion.211
Evaluation of effect thus necessarily involves consideration of
the reasonable expectation of the audience. Individuals attend
worship services with the desire and expectation of participating in
a religious exercise; they attend with the desire and expectation of
listening, endorsing, and being moved by the religious message
that is set forth in word and song. In contrast, individuals attend a
concert, not with the expectation of participating in a religious
exercise or endorsing a religious message, but with the desire and
expectation of listening to music. The expectations of audience
members at a concert are thus similar to the expectations of the
208. JONAS BARISH, THE ANTI-THEATRICAL PREJUDICE 81 (1981).
209. Id.
210. Id; see also STEVEN B. KATZ, THE EPISTEMIC MUSIC OF RHETORIC 213 (1996)
(quoting SUSANNE LANGER, FEELING AND FORM: A THEORY OF ART 139–40 (1953), in
distinguishing “artistic utterance” which “‘always strives to create as complete and trans-
parent a symbol as possible’” from “personal utterance” which arises from “actual emo-
tion [and] usually contents itself with half-articulated symbols’”).
211. See Bauchman v. West High Sch., Civ. No. 95-C–506G, 1996 WL 407856, at *4
(D. Utah May 30, 1996) (“The five off campus performances which were held at sites
owned by religious institutions were concerts not in conjunction with religious services.”);
Doe v. Duncanville Indep. Sch. Dist., 70 F.3d 402, 407–08 & n.8 (5th Cir. 1995)
(“[P]articularly in the world of choral music, singing about religion is not the same as
endorsing or exercising religion.”).
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viewers of art in a “typical museum setting,” a context which
“negates any message of endorsement.”212
Theories regarding the aesthetics of music213 further illustrate
the relevance of listener expectation and perception in a legal
analysis of context. Under a holistic view of music, a musical work
is created not just by acts of composition (the composer writing
the music), but also by acts of interpretation (the interpretive
choices the artist makes in performing the work) and acts of per-
ception (how the listener perceives the performance of the work).
Insofar as expectation influences perception, if listener expectation
and perception are musically relevant factors in creating the musi-
cal work, certainly listener expectation and perception are also rel-
evant in considering the legal effects of performing that musical
work.
True, the text of the Messiah’s “Glory to God”214 is identical
to the text of the state-sponsored crèche display that was declared
unconstitutional in County of Allegheny.215 However, although
the texts are nearly identical, there are important distinctions.
First, as noted above, a performance in a concert setting makes no
claim of reality; the performance is art, which by its nature is, at
most, an alterer and imitator of reality, but not in fact reality.216
The text in County of Allegheny, given its placement above a
Christmas crèche display in a county courthouse, was unconstitu-
tional in its similarity to the words being uttered in a church ser-
vice.217 There was “nothing in the context of the display [to] de-
tract[] from the crèche’s religious message.”218 That is, there was
no disclaimer of reality; there was no claim of “performance”—no
claim that the state, by presenting the crèche and accompanying
message in the county courthouse, was not endorsing the religious
212. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 595 (1989) (quoting Lynch v.
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 692 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring)).
213. See supra note 29.
214. The text reads, “Glory to God in the highest, and peace on earth, goodwill to-
ward men.” George F. Handel, Glory to God from MESSIAH 68 (Watkins Shaw ed.,
1981).
215. See supra notes 117–21 and accompanying text.
216. See GEORGE R. PUTTENHAM, The Arte of English Poesie, in 2 ELIZABETHAN
CRITICAL ESSAYS 1, 188 (G. Gregory Smith ed., 1904) (“[A]rte is . . . an alterer [of na-
ture] . . . arte is . . . a bare immitatour of natures works, following and counterfeyting
her actions and effects . . . .”).
217. See County of Allegheny 492 U.S. at 598.
218. Id. at 573.
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content of the message. The reasonable perception of the audience
in the County of Allegheny context was that this display was a
realistic symbol of the state’s religious preferences. In the context
of the above hypothetical, however, the reasonable perception of
an audience would be that the performance is just that—a perfor-
mance—and not a statement of religious ideology. The perfor-
mance context detracts from the significance of the music as a
religious symbol and emphasizes the significance of the music as
art.
This is not to say that all “performances” of sacred music will
negate any effect of endorsement and will be constitutional. Al-
though the notion of performance and the artifice encompassed
therein will weigh heavily in terms of negating any inference of
endorsement, there might be other contextual elements that could
cause a performance to convey a message of endorsement. Cer-
tainly, if the high school chorus were to perform Messiah as part
of a worship service, there could be an effect of endorsement.
Even if the students involved felt that they were merely entertain-
ing, a reasonable observer might fairly perceive them to be partici-
pating in a religious exercise. Remarks by the conductor might
also cause a performance to convey a message of endorsement.
For example, opening a concert with a prayer recitation219 or de-
livering a speech that thanks God for having the opportunity to
make music would tend to lessen the performative aspect of the
concert and emphasize the religious nature of the music. One
might argue then, that the choir director’s comments in Bauch-
man220 did have the effect of endorsing religion. By invoking di-
vine thanks in his “real” as opposed to performative statements, in
a concert presented in a religious site, the choir director’s state-
ments could result in the fair inference that the accompanying
performance of sacred music was a musical extension of his per-
sonal beliefs and an endorsement of religion. In finding that an
objective, reasonable observer would not view the choir director’s
statements as endorsing a particular religion, the Bauchman court
may have relied too heavily on the fact that particular observers
219. Cf. Sease v. School Dist., 811 F. Supp. 183, 189–90 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (relying in
part on pre-performance prayer sessions in concluding that a high school gospel choir’s
activities were religious in nature for Equal Access Act purposes).
220. See supra notes 181–82 and accompanying text.
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did not perceive his statements to be a prayer or to be an en-
dorsement of religion.221
The site of the performance also contributes to context. Al-
though a performance in a concert hall is less likely to convey a
message of endorsement, it may be possible to have a concert in a
religious site—such as a church or temple—without conveying an
endorsement of religion. The key factors in the analysis of a per-
formance at a religious site would be the presence of performative
accoutrements which might include applause, distributing a pro-
gram with explanatory notes, labelling the event a concert, and
opening the concert to the public. Another factor that contributes
to the context of this hypothetical is the time of year. The fact
that the concert is in December, however, does not cause the
performance to convey a message of endorsement. The Court has
repeatedly held that Christmas has become a part of American
secular culture.222 This secularization of Christmas weighed in the
Eighth Circuit’s determination, in Florey v. Sioux Falls School
District,223 that the singing of Christmas carols in public schools
did not have the effect of endorsing religion.224 Moreover, the
particular use of Handel’s Messiah in a December concert has
greater secular than religious significance. First, the piece was
originally composed for the concert hall, not for the Church.225
Second, the use of the Messiah during the Christmas season is an
American cultural phenomenon that originated with secular music
organizations;226 the piece was originally performed in April.227
221. See Bauchman v. West High Sch., Civ. No. 95-C–506G, 1996 WL 407856, at *8
(D. Utah May 30, 1998).
222. See, e.g., County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 601 (noting that “government may
celebrate Christmas in some manner and form, but not in a way that endorses Christian
doctrine”).
223. 619 F.2d 1311 (8th Cir. 1980).
224. See supra notes 148–55 and accompanying text.
225. See VAN CAMP, supra note 207, at 3–4 (debunking the myth that Messiah was a
Christmas piece intended as church music, and noting that it was first performed in a
secular hall and “was not written as church music”). “Handel was never a church mu-
sician, and he seldom wrote music for the Church. He was always a composer for the
theatre and the concert hall . . . . In his day Messiah was a public
‘entertainment’ . . . .” Id. at 4 (quoting ROBERT MANSON MYERS, A TOUCHSTONE OF
TASTE 84–85 (1971)).
226. See id. at 4 (noting that the annual Christmas performance tradition originated in
Britain with the Caecilian Society of London and in the United States with The Boston
Handel and Haydn Society and that the “annual Christmas Messiahs . . . ha[ve] become
an American phenomenon”).
227. See id. at 3 (noting that the piece was first performed on April 13, 1742).
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Perhaps even more important than this cultural secularization
in negating any effect of endorsement is the presence of program
notes in the above hypothetical. Program notes describe the rele-
vant musical characteristics of a piece and explain the significance
of a piece of music within the genre. Thus, program notes are
analogous to the sign in County of Allegheny, which held that the
menorah and Christmas tree in the town’s display did not effec-
tively endorse religion. While the explanatory sign was not the
only factor in the decision, Justice Blackmun found the sign’s
presence significant in negating any message of endorsement.228
The presence of program notes in this hypothetical serves a
similar purpose to the sign in County of Allegheny, and, while the
presence of program notes is not the only controlling factor, it is
similarly significant. Music never exists in a vacuum; it is always
the product of a variety of forces—historical, political, literary, or
religious—affecting the composer. Program notes can educate
audiences as to those forces. By educating audiences as to the
musical reasons for the performance and by focusing audience
attention on musically relevant aspects of the work, program notes
reinforce the identity of the music as an independent aesthetic
entity rather than as a vehicle for promoting a religious mes-
sage.229 Accordingly, even a performance of sacred choral music
where students participated in a processional march or carried can-
dles could be constitutional if the musical explanation for a proces-
sional march or incorporating candles were carefully conveyed in
228. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 619 (1989) (Blackmun, J., con-
curring); see also supra note 124 and accompanying text.
229. However, one might also imagine notations in a concert program that would
have the opposite effect. For example, if a concert program included unexplained reli-
gious symbols or stated in reference to a sacred or even a secular piece of music, “The
beauty and ingenuity of this music surely illustrates the infinite creative power of God,”
the program would have the effect of endorsing religion. Such statements or symbols
would emphasize the music not as an independent aesthetic entity, but rather, as a vehi-
cle for divine praise and religious worship. Cf. Sease v. School Dist., 811 F. Supp. 183,
189–90 (relying in part on concert program “replete with religious symbols, quotes from
scripture, and references to ‘Jesus’ ‘God’, and ‘Our Savior’” in concluding that school
gospel choir’s activities were religious in nature for Equal Access Act purposes). Howev-
er, including such unconstitutional statements or symbols would be distinguishable from
including the text of the pieces on the program. It is a standard concert practice to in-
clude in concert programs the text of pieces performed, especially translations of pieces
performed in foreign languages. The inclusion of such text, as opposed to unrelated bibli-
cal verse for example, would not have the effect of endorsing religion but would under-
score the musically significant relationship between music and text.
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the program. A fairly understood explanation for such a perfor-
mance could be that the concert intended to create a “historical
performance.” For example, many Baroque orchestras use original
instruments in order to present a performance that recreates, as
closely as possible, the sound of the music as it was originally
heard by Baroque audiences. In addition, choirs that specialize in
renaissance music, such as madrigals, might perform in traditional
renaissance attire. In the same way, a chorus might process with
candles in singing a Gregorian chant in order to recreate condi-
tions of original performance. Such a performance could be consti-
tutional if program notes explained the musical and historical
significance of such performance conditions as aspects of the per-
formance. By emphasizing the music as an independent aesthetic
entity, program notes would serve to negate any effect of endorse-
ment of religion.230
Similarly, the rehearsal context in this hypothetical does not
convey a message of endorsement. The factors that might contrib-
ute to a rehearsal context include the statements made by and the
teaching style of the choir director. In this hypothetical, the teach-
er does not proselytize. She does not discuss the virtues of a par-
ticular religion or of religion in general. She does not encourage
students to adopt a religion. The teacher’s unvoiced inner hope to
230. The MENC has made a similar suggestion, stating: “It is important to communi-
cate that music learning, not religious indoctrination, is the motivation in choosing reper-
toire. One way to reinforce this is to list the music concepts/skills associated with each
song in a printed program.” MENC 1996 Position Statement, supra note 62, at 3.
Further, as previously discussed, see supra note 97, there is disagreement within the
Court as to whether the quantum of knowledge attributed to the reasonable observer
should include a collective knowledge of community history and context of the govern-
ment practice at issue. By educating audiences as to the musical reasons for the perfor-
mance and by focusing audience attention on musically relevant aspects of the work,
program notes serve to equalize this quantum of community knowledge attributable to
the reasonable observer. By making collective musical knowledge explicit to the actual
audience, program notes would make a particular performance less likely to convey an
effect of endorsement under either view of the quantum of knowledge attributable to the
reasonable observer.
Finally, in addition to negating any effect of endorsement, program notes may
address a greater social problem. If after a public school choral concert, the only thing
two people in an audience can discuss is whether the concert was “too Christian” or
“too secular,” the problem may not be constitutional but may point to the greater social
issue that audiences do not know what to listen for. As the prevalence of MTV and the
disparity of “classical” to “rock” radio stations suggests, widespread exposure to “classi-
cal” music is not commonplace. Program notes may serve to appropriately focus audience
attention on musically relevant aspects of the work, and encourage discourse and dialogue
about musical aspects of the performance.
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effect such a result, unaccompanied by proselytizing conduct, does
not render the rehearsal context an unconstitutional establishment
of religion. Certainly, if the teacher were to explicitly encourage
students to adopt a particular faith, she would be endorsing reli-
gion in violation of the Establishment Clause. Similarly, if the
teacher were to condition proper understanding or performance of
the music on acceptance of the textual message—for example, by
saying, “You must accept the fact that God gave his only begotten
son for the forgiveness of our sins in order to understand and
present a convincing performance of this piece”—there would be
the effect of endorsing religion and a violation of the Establish-
ment Clause.
However, in analyzing whether the use of sacred choral music
in a particular rehearsal context has the effect of endorsing reli-
gion, one must also be mindful of the important relationship be-
tween music and text that is central to composition, interpretation,
and performance. As such, within the context of rehearsing a piece
of sacred choral music, many statements that might seem—in the
abstract—to have an effect of endorsing religion do not have such
effect. For example, a teacher’s statement, such as “Bring out the
glory in this line ‘Glory to God,’” might seem to endorse religion.
However, in the context of rehearsing “Glory to God” from
Handel’s Messiah, this statement is not an endorsement of religion.
The Bauchman court similarly, and correctly, found that the choir
director’s statements encouraging students to “feel the music” and
to “listen to the words” did not have the effect of endorsing reli-
gion.231
The statements made by the choral directors in both
Bauchman and this hypothetical do not endorse religion because,
in the context of rehearsal, such statements can be fairly under-
stood as part of a religiously-neutral, valid pedagogical technique.
This pedagogical technique emphasizes tone painting, a common
compositional device in setting text to music, whereby the compos-
er aurally illustrates the meaning of the text in the music.232 It is
231. See Bauchman v. West High Sch., Civ. No. 95-C–506G, 1996 WL 407856, at *7
(D. Utah May 30, 1996). Although the Bauchman court reached the correct result, the
court did not elaborate as to why such statements could not be fairly understood to
endorse religion. See id.
232. Tone painting could involve anything from having the melodic line ascend when
the text describes the sky, to using dissonant harmonies when the text expresses a con-
cept such as hate or sadness, to using major tonic chords when the text expresses happi-
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pedagogically necessary for a music teacher to discuss the meaning
of the text insofar as that meaning relates—or does not relate if
the composer is using sarcasm or irony—to the music. Encouraging
students to “feel the music” or to reflect the meaning of the text
through the tone they produce vocally or through their facial ex-
pression does not demonstrate endorsement of religion but, rather,
demonstrates artistic sensitivity to the relationship between music
and text. Directing students to “feel the music” or to consider the
underlying text is distinguishable from directing students to “be-
lieve the text,” which would be an endorsement. Indeed, a choir
singing Messiah excerpts would look and sound ridiculous singing
“Behold the lamb of God that taketh away the sins of the world,”
set in somber G minor to the slow tempo Largo, with a bright,
happy tone and grinning facial expressions. Similarly, a choir
would look and sound equally ridiculous singing, “Glory to God in
the Highest,” set in bright D major with prominent brass orches-
tration, to the sprightly tempo Allegro, with a dark, gloomy tone
and sad facial expressions.233 A music teacher would even be ar-
tistically sensitive to the meaning of the text by encouraging stu-
dents to think of something other than its literal meaning in order
to evoke the appropriate tone; for example, in rehearsing “Glory
to God,” the teacher might direct students to reflect in their tone
and expression whatever thought gives them joy or happiness.
Therefore, encouraging students to “feel the music” could reason-
ably be interpreted, not as endorsing the textual message, but as
encouraging any manner of feeling which is consistent with the
character of the music, whether that feeling is related to the literal
ness. See Schwadron, supra note 53, at 162 (“Conductors sometimes try to produce spe-
cial musical effects by spoken word-pictures (e.g. ‘Can you get the hate of the crowd
into that ‘vah’?’ . . . .”) (citations omitted); NATTIEZ, supra note 12, at 125–26 tbl. 5.1
(collating interpretations of tonal symbolism from works of four composers and demon-
strating usage of certain keys to convey similar emotions); DERYCK COOKE, THE LAN-
GUAGE OF MUSIC 14–15 (1959) (citing numerous examples of composers using musical
motives to express certain emotions, including the minor sixth falling to fifth to express
anguish, the phrase 1–3–5–6–5 in a major scale to express joy, and minor keys to express
tragedy).
233. See COOKE, supra note 232, at 14–15. Cooke describes the relationship between
music and text and argues that “[w]ithin the orbit of tonality, composers have always
been bound by certain expressive laws of the medium.” Id. at 15. He asks, “Did anyone
ever set the Resurrexit of the Mass to slow, soft, minor music? Or the Crucifixus to
quick, loud, major strains? Try singing the word ‘Crucifixus’ to the music of Handel’s
Hallelujah Chorus, or the word ‘Hallelujah’ to the music of the Crucifixus in Bach’s B
minor Mass!” Id. at 14.
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meaning of the text or not. In this hypothetical, then, the directive
“feel the music,” given in the context of rehearsing the Messiah
excerpts, does not have the effect of endorsing religion.
Based on the foregoing, in this hypothetical performance and
teaching context, the inclusion of Handel’s Messiah in the curricu-
lum is constitutional. Although the music teacher has an unvoiced
religious motivation in addition to her secular motivation for se-
lecting the piece, this purpose is not as probative of constitutional-
ity as the effect of using the music. It is the effect, dependent on
context, that is most determinative. Given the relevant factors of
these performance and teaching contexts, the use of Handel’s Mes-
siah does not have the effect of endorsing religion.
B. Performance at Graduation Ceremony
The high school chorus performs one selection as part of the high
school graduation ceremony. The choir director selects An Irish
Blessing by Dede Duson, a four-part a cappella piece from the
current repertoire of the chorus. The text reads:
May the road rise to meet you;
May the wind be always at your back;
May the sun shine warm upon your face, and the rain fall
soft upon your fields;
And until we meet again, may God hold you in the palm of
His hand.234
Before the choir performs, the principal announces to the audi-
ence, “We will now hear a musical selection from the chorus.”
The names of the piece and the composer, and the dates of the
composer’s birth and death, appear in the graduation program.
The choir performs the piece in the middle of the ceremony, while
the audience is seated. The audience applauds at the conclusion of
the piece.
The performance of music at ceremonial occasions is common-
place and even expected.235 There could be many secular purpos-
es in performing this piece at a graduation ceremony, such as
underscoring the collective nature of the ceremony or merely
showcasing the school choir (lest choir members be denied the
same opportunity to perform at graduation that is provided to the
234. Dede Duson, An Irish Blessing (Neil A. Kjos Music Co., 1982).
235. See STORR, supra note 10, at 23–24.
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school band, which will almost certainly play Pomp and Circum-
stance). However, in considering the constitutionality of the above
hypothetical, the more determinative inquiry is the effect of this
performance, which is determined by context.
In determining whether this hypothetical graduation perfor-
mance of An Irish Blessing has the effect of endorsing religion, we
must first address whether, in light of the Supreme Court’s deci-
sion in Lee v. Weisman,236 hearing or singing a piece of sacred
choral music in the context of a public school graduation is a
“religious exercise.” Although the Court’s holding in Weisman
forbids the use of prayers in the public school graduation context,
Weisman may be distinguished from the Irish Blessing hypothetical
on the basis of the differences between prayers and choral music.
In declaring state-directed prayer in public schools to be violative
of the Establishment Clause, the Engel Court relied on an “always
religious” definition of prayer.237 This holding was reaffirmed by
the Court in Weisman.238 Therefore, state-directed prayer is clear-
ly constitutionally impermissible under the Establishment Clause.
On the other hand, as the conflict between music and religion in
the context of the worship service reveals,239 unlike prayer, sa-
cred choral music is not “always religious.” While sacred choral
music may be a vehicle for religious worship and divine praise, it
may simultaneously be a secular aesthetic entity that in no way
depends on the performer’s or the listener’s endorsement of the
textual message.
The text at issue here, in particular the line, “May God hold
you in the palm of his hand,” and the title, “An Irish Blessing,”
could be characterized as a “supplication for the blessings of the
Almighty.”240 If these words were to be recited in the graduation
ceremony, there would almost certainly be a state-directed reli-
gious exercise and an effective endorsement of religion. If the
words were to be recited, the hypothetical would come closer to
the facts of Aldine, which involved a school-composed prayer that
236. 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
237. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 424 (1962).
238. See Weisman, 505 U.S. at 603.
239. See supra Introduction (discussing historical conflict concerning use of sacred
music in worship service and fear of religious leaders that music in worship service will
be appreciated for its secular rather than its religious qualities).
240. Engel, 370 U.S. at 424.
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was both recited and sung by the school community.241 The reci-
tation practice by the school community could cause any subse-
quent singing to be understood as a parallel to the recitation and
thereby as a promotion of religious worship and divine praise.
However, in the Irish Blessing hypothetical, the lyrics to the song
are not recited in the graduation ceremony.
In addition, the religious aspects of the text do not require
the conclusion that the song—a combination of music and text—is
a prayer, nor that the singing of the song is an act of worship. Ar-
guably, once music and text are combined, each loses its indepen-
dent significance and becomes a new entity. Given the inherent
duality of music, the presence of a melodic and harmonic line
detracts from the independent religious significance of the text.
And the more complicated the music, the less emphasis on the
music as vehicle for religious message and the greater the empha-
sis on the music as independent aesthetic entity.242 This might be
the case with the four-part harmony in An Irish Blessing. In Engel,
the Supreme Court also recognized this dual nature of music in
asserting that singing a patriotic song in which the composer has
professed faith in a Supreme Being is not the equivalent of a “re-
ligious exercise”:
There is of course nothing in the decision reached here that is
inconsistent with the fact that school children and others are offi-
cially encouraged to express love for our country . . . by singing
officially espoused anthems which include the composer’s profes-
sions of faith in a Supreme Being. . . . Such . . . ceremonial
occasions bear no true resemblance to the unquestioned religious
exercise that the State of New York has sponsored in this in-
stance.243
The Court’s statement ultimately relies on the dual nature of the
music at issue. While a patriotic anthem that mentions a divine
being might, for the composer, be a profession of faith in a Su-
241. See Doe v. Aldine Indep. Sch. Dist., 563 F. Supp. 883, 885 (S.D. Tex. 1982).
242. The historic conflict between music and religion supports this argument:
The fear of the European church leaders of the misuse of music was vastly
heightened with the development of polyphony. Ornamentation and highly
melismatic settings . . . had long threatened the clarity of the words. But the
collisions of different phrases or word fragments and the musical cross-rhythms
of Notre Dame polyphony were a further attack on verbal clarity.
PERRIS, supra note 8, at 141.
243. Engel, 370 U.S. at 435 n.21.
FILE:C:\WP51\DLJ\KASPARIA.PP Dec 12/06/97 Sat 10:47am
1160 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 46 :1111
preme Being, the same anthem might, for the singer or listener, be
a secular expression of patriotic love. These dual perceptions are
relevant to the legal analysis of effect and are anticipated by a
holistic theory of music, under which the singer’s interpretation
and the listener’s perception contribute to the very creation of the
musical work.
Another factor that distinguishes the context of singing An
Irish Blessing from the facts of Weisman is the absence of cler-
gy.244 The state is not “entangling” itself with a religious leader
and directing the content of the religious leader’s prayer by in-
viting a religious leader to speak and by providing that person
with guidelines for suitable prayer composition. Although it may
be argued that, despite the absence of the clergy, selection by the
choir director is the functional equivalent of the state composing
the school prayer in Engel or the state compositional involvement
in Weisman, this argument requires finding that a song is
equivalent to prayer. However, as argued above, a piece of music,
even that with a sacred text, differs from a prayer in that it is not
“always religious.” The performance of a piece of music, unlike a
prayer, is not by its very nature a “religious exercise” and is dis-
tinguishable from an “act of worship.” A member of the clergy is
not “performing,” and the reasonable perception of listeners is that
they are participating in an “act of worship.” A choir singing a
song is performing and can be objectively perceived by its listeners
to be performing. These aesthetic and functional differences, in-
cluding the claim or disclaimer of reality by the artifice of per-
formance and the differing expectations of the audience, distin-
guish a song from a prayer.
These differences between song and prayer, in light of Engel
and Weisman, inform the “effects” analysis. As with the first hypo-
thetical, the context of singing An Irish Blessing is a public perfor-
mance which, by its very nature, negates any effect of endorse-
ment. The audience is not being asked to recite the text of the
song; the audience is not being asked to stand while an individual
244. There is a split of authority in the Circuit Courts as to whether student-led
prayer at graduation is constitutional. See ACLU of New Jersey v. Black Horse Pike
Regional Bd. of Educ., 84 F.3d 1471 (3rd Cir. 1996) (striking policy allowing majority of
students to decide whether or not to have prayer at public school’s graduation ceremony;
Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 977 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied 113 S.
Ct. 2950 (1993) (upholding policy allowing majority of students to decide whether or not
to have prayer at public school’s graduation ceremony).
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reads the text of the song. Those uses would come closer to a
religious exercise—to the facts of Weisman or Engel—and could
reasonably be perceived as an “endorsement.” Rather, in this
hypothetical, the audience remains seated while a choral group
performs. The fact that the audience claps at the end of the song
further emphasizes the performance context. And this performance
context easily distinguishes this hypothetical from the unconstitu-
tional singing of the school prayer in Aldine.245 In Aldine, there
was no performative disclaimer of reality. The prayer was sung or
recited not by the school chorus but by the school community.246
The text specifically referred to reality—“please bless our
school”247—and the text was incorporated into the everyday
school routine through its posting in raised black letters on the
wall of the gymnasium.248
There is a final aspect of the performance context of this
hypothetical that bears on this “effect” analysis: the placement of
the song within the program. Placing this song at the end of the
ceremony may alter the context. Arguably, the effect of placing
the song at the end of the ceremony might be that the song could
reasonably be viewed not as a performance, but as a prayer, in
lieu of a benediction.249 In this case, however, since the song is
performed in the middle of the ceremony, the placement of the
song has no ritualistic religious significance. It is simply a perfor-
mance of a musical selection within the ceremony. Moreover, it is
indicated as such and emphasized for its musical identity through
the graduation program and through the principal’s introduction.
In this hypothetical, the performance of An Irish Blessing
brings art into the ceremony and makes neither any claim of reali-
245. See Aldine, 563 F. Supp. at 884 (concerning the singing of words of prayer by
the entire student body at sporting events, pep rallies, and graduation ceremonies).
246. See id.
247. Id. (emphasis added).
248. See id.
249. Arguably, the Duncanville court should have considered whether the singing of
the choir’s theme song at the end of class every Friday and on bus rides home from
performances would similarly convey an effect of endorsement, especially given the fact
that there is no performative disclaimer of reality and no readily understandable teaching
purpose to repeatedly singing the song at conclusionary times. See Doe v. Duncanville
Indep. Sch. Dist., 70 F.3d 402, 404 (5th Cir. 1995) (concerning the singing of a Christian
theme sung by the choir at the end of class on Fridays, at the end of some performanc-
es, and at choral competitions); see also infra notes 252–60 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing a third hypothetical).
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ty nor any claim that the choir director, performers, school admin-
istrators, or listeners endorse any religious aspects of the text.
While the singing of these words in a worship service might be
akin to prayer, the singing of these words in the context of a
performance is not a prayer. As with the first hypothetical, by
presenting the song as music, the context of performance negates
any message of endorsement. In this case, the placement within
the order of the ceremony, the inclusion in the program, and in-
troduction in such a way as to emphasize the musical significance
of the performance all contribute to the performance context. To
further emphasize this musical significance, the choir director could
write a short program note, making explicit the musical signifi-
cance of the piece and the musical reasons for the selection. Even
without such notes, however, the singing of An Irish Blessing by
the school choir is a musical performance that serves as an appro-
priate adjunct to the graduation ceremony, reinforcing the com-
munal and collective aspect of the event insofar as the song is
sung by a collective group—the school choir. Thus, the perfor-
mance of the song in the context of this hypothetical does not
have the effect of endorsing religion.
C. Designating and Singing a Theme Song
The high school choir designates a four-part arrangement of
George Gershwin’s “Oh Lawd, I’m On My Way,” from Porgy
and Bess,250 as its theme song. The song is recognized as such
by the school community, including the choir director. As theme
song, the piece is performed in every concert and indicated as
“theme song” in programs. The piece is also sung, under the di-
rection of the choir director, at the end of class on Fridays, and
on bus rides home after concerts and competitions.
250. The text reads:
Oh, Lawd, I’m on my way.
I’m on my way to a Heav’nly Lan’,
I’ll ride dat long, long road,
If you are there to guide my han’.
Oh Lawd, I’m on my way.
I’m on my way to a Heav’nly Lan’ oh Lawd.
It’s a long, long way, but you’ll be there to take my han’.
George Gershwin, Oh, Lawd, I’m On My Way, from PORGY AND BESS (Gershwin Pub-
lishing Corp., 1935).
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In considering whether this use of sacred music has the effect
of endorsing religion, there are two features of this hypothetical
that are especially problematic: 1) the designation of the song as
theme song and the affect of this designation on the performance
context; and 2) the singing of the song at the end of class on
Fridays and on bus rides home after concerts and competitions.
The designation of “Oh Lawd, I’m On My Way,” as theme
song alters the performance context such that performing this song
even in a concert hall could convey a message of endorsement.
Consistent with the previous hypotheticals, it is not the selection of
the piece as part of the choir’s repertoire that is constitutionally
problematic, nor is it the fact that the piece is performed with
frequency. If this piece was performed in every concert but was
not labelled as theme song, there would arguably not be a mes-
sage of endorsement. As stated above, the inherent artifice and
disclaimer of reality in a true performance context can negate any
effect of endorsement. However, the designation of the song as
theme song alters the performance context and may have the
effect of endorsing religion.
The choir’s designation of the song as their “theme song” de-
notes the concept of group identification rather than the
performative notion of artifice. Even if one accepts that there
could be pedagogical benefits to designating a theme song,251
these benefits cannot be achieved through a method that has the
effect of endorsing religion. The notion of recognizing insiders and
outsiders on the basis of religion, embodied in the endorsement
test, is contrary to the Establishment Clause. This recognition of
insiders and outsiders is inherent in the concept of group identity.
The theme song unifies the choir, and the choir identifies the
group by the song; moreover, the community identifies the group
with the song. Using religious symbolism to identify a group could
convey a message of endorsement to the reasonable observer. That
the students have designated the song as their “theme song” does
not lessen the effect of endorsement, given that state ac-
tors—including the choir director—continue to recognize and to
identify the song as such in concert programs.
251. One benefit might be that a theme song builds community by making students
feel more invested in their choir. As a result, students may sing with the choir for a
longer period of time, further developing their musical skills and strengthening the overall
sound and ability of the choir.
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Giving the song the label of theme song and identifying the
chorus with that song also lessens the theatrical artifice aspect of
the performance. When a group is identified by a particular sacred
choral song, it is more likely that the members of the group will
be viewed as endorsing the meaning of that song when they sing
the song—even if the performance takes place in a concert hall.
There is no meaningful disclaimer of reality.
However, there could conceivably be a situation where having
a sacred song as a “theme song” did not convey a message of
endorsement. For example, if the choir selected a particular sacred
song as a “theme song” because of the song’s independent secular
significance to the choir, there might not be an effect of endorse-
ment. Perhaps the choir won several choral competitions for its
performance of the song and, as a result, chose the song for its
“theme song.” If this independent secular significance was ex-
plained in the program or known to the community, then even if
the group was identified by the song, and even if this identification
lessens the performative artifice somewhat, there might not be an
effect of endorsement. In this example, the group would not be
perceived to identify with the religious message of the song but
with an independent secular significance of the song.
Nonetheless, in this hypothetical, in addition to the labeling of
“Oh Lawd, I’m On My Way,” as “theme song,” the singing of this
song (whether designated as “theme song” or not) at the end of
class on Fridays and on bus rides home from competitions and
concerts could have the effect of endorsing religion. In this hy-
pothetical, the effect or “perceived purpose” of singing the song at
the end of class every Friday and on bus rides after concerts may
be fairly understood as prayer, a solemn avowal of divine faith
and supplication for the blessings of the Almighty. In other words,
there is no performative disclaimer of reality. The singing of the
song in these contexts does not have a fairly understood non-reli-
gious purpose. It does not seem to be for rehearsal purposes; in
this hypothetical, the teacher is not rehearsing the piece nor per-
fecting the group’s interpretation or critically evaluating their sing-
ing. The group is not singing the song at the beginning of rehears-
al or before competitions as a warm-up or focusing device. Rather,
in its repetition at significant conclusionary times, the context of
the use of this theme song has the attributes of a religious ritual
or exercise. Given the context, which emphasizes the song as a
vehicle for religious worship rather than as an independent aes-
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thetic entity, one would be hard pressed to find an alternative way
in which such singing could be understood.
This analysis is clearly contrary to the Fifth Circuit’s opinion
in Doe v. Duncanville Independent School District,252 where the
court held that designation of a sacred song as “theme song” did
not have the purpose or effect of endorsing religion.253 However,
the Fifth Circuit’s finding of constitutionality is problematic for
many reasons. First, in determining that there were fairly under-
stood secular purposes to maintaining the song as theme song, the
court accepted the choir director’s assertions that the song is use-
ful for teaching students to sight-sing and to sing a cappella and
the piece is a “good piece of music . . . by a reputable com-
poser.”254 Both of these justifications have no relationship with
the designation of the song as “theme song” rather than one of
many songs in the repertoire. The justification that the piece is
useful for teaching sight-reading is especially irrelevant, because
any piece can be useful in teaching sight-reading, and, if the pur-
pose is to teach sight-reading, there is no reason to repeatedly sing
the piece once it has been sight-read.
Second, the court mischaracterized the practical effects of
designating the song as “theme song.” The court stated that there
were two practical effects, that the piece is “sung often and it is
carried over from year to year.”255 The court only addressed
these two effects and found that, given the prevalence of sacred
choral music in the repertoire, “[l]imiting the number of times a
religious piece of music can be sung is tantamount to censorship
and does not send students a message of neutrality.”256 While the
singing of the song in Duncanville257 could be constitutional were
those the only practical effects of designating a sacred choral song
as theme song, the practice appears unconstitutional on the basis
of facts cited in the opinion but not addressed by the Fifth Circuit.
The court never addressed the singing of the song at the end of
class on Fridays nor the singing of the song on bus rides home
from performances, although these important practical effects of
252. 70 F.3d 402 (5th Cir. 1995).
253. See id. at 407.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 408.
257. See id. at 404.
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designating the song as theme song are noted in the facts.258 Be-
cause of this oversight, the court never addressed the arguments
raised here—that such a use of the song, in those particular con-
texts, does effectively endorse religion in its similarity to religious
exercise and ritual. Further, while the court did consider the con-
cept of group identity inherent in the nature of designating a
theme song, the court failed to consider group identity in relation
to the performance context.259 The court only considered the
concept of group identity from the perspective of choir members
and did not consider how the concept of group identity affects the
objective perceptions of the audience in the context of a perfor-
mance.260
Despite the Fifth Circuit’s holding in Duncanville, the designa-
tion of the sacred choral song as “theme song” in this hypothetical
does convey group identity and thereby alters the performance
context so as to convey a message of endorsement. And the
director’s leading the singing of the song, on Fridays and on bus
rides home after concerts and competitions, conveys a ritualistic
emphasis on religious exercise rather than on aesthetics. To the
reasonable observer, these uses could easily carry a message of
endorsement. Both of these factors on their own, and certainly in
conjunction, could make the use of sacred music in this hypotheti-
cal unconstitutional.
CONCLUSION
Music is a medium of tremendous emotive and persuasive
power. The combination of this tremendous power with vocal
music’s inherently dual nature—that vocal music can simultaneous-
ly be a vehicle for the promotion of a textual message as well as
an independent aesthetic entity that in no way depends on the
performer’s or the listener’s endorsement of the textual message—
causes tension between music and religion. In the choirs of the
public schools, this tension invites Establishment Clause controver-
sy.
258. See id.
259. See id. at 408 n.8. Consideration of group identity in relation to the performance
context was deemed relevant by Justice O’Connor in her articulation of the “endorsement
test” in Lynch v. Donnelly. See supra notes 91–92 and accompanying text.
260. See Duncanville, 70 F.3d at 408 n.8.
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In defending the place of sacred music within public school
curricula, it has been asserted that
[i]f it is possible to study Communism without indoctrination or
to examine the ills of contemporary society without promoting
the seeds of revolution, then it must also be possible to study
sacred music (with performance-related activities) without paroch-
ialistic attitudes and sectarian points of view.261
This Note has argued that it is possible to study sacred music in
the public schools without effectively endorsing religion or violat-
ing the Establishment Clause. Whether a particular use of sacred
choral music has the effect of endorsing religion is dependent on
context. As composer-philosopher John Cage has remarked, “[T]he
work of art . . . is finished by the observer.”262 For some, sacred
music can be a vehicle for promoting a religious message—a reli-
gious symbol. Music educators must be “mindful of the power of a
symbol standing alone and unexplained.”263 Music educators can
and must take steps to ensure that a particular context does not
have the effect of endorsing religion, by emphasizing the indepen-
dent, secular identity of this music. Stressing the musical signifi-
cance of a particular rehearsal technique or preparing program
notes for performances can negate any message of endorsement.
Such pedagogical techniques may also underscore the identity of
the music as an independent, secular, aesthetic entity that in no
way depends on the performer’s or the listener’s endorsement of
the textual message.
Teaching and performing sacred choral music in contexts that
emphasize the independent aesthetic identity of this music is con-
sistent with the purpose of the Establishment Clause and of the
First Amendment—protecting freedom of individual conscience.
Exposing students to sacred music does not, in itself, violate the
individual conscience. Exposing students to sacred music as part of
a comprehensive music education curriculum values the profession-
al judgment of music educators, broadens the educational experi-
ence and presents a complete and accurate view of the nature of
art. It is the censorship of sacred choral music that presents a
261. Schwadron, supra note 53, at 166.
262. MUSICAGE, supra note 12, at 67 (citing the philosophy of the artist Duchamp).
263. Capital Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 115 S. Ct. 2440, 2466 (1995)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
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selective, revisionist view of history and stunts the educational
experience.
